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
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Anguis in Herba :
OR THE *Diipol*
Fatal Consequences

OF A
TREATY with FRANCE.

Wherein it is proved,

That the Principles whereby the *French* King governs himself, will not allow him to observe any Treaty longer than it is for his Interest to break it.

That he has always aimed at the Union of the Crowns of *France* and *Spain* since the *Pyrenean* Treaty.


That, notwithstanding his Pretences to the contrary, such is his Design at this day. And,

That nothing can prevent it, but to reduce his Power to such a Degree, as may perfectly break his Measures.

Homo versutus & pleraq; fraudibus miscens, usq; in sola ponens utilitate, qui veritatem mendacio nihilo meliorem aiebat, sed utriusq; pretium & dignitatem usu desinebat, qui pueros talis, viros sacramentis decipi debere jactavit,
Plut. de Lyfandro,

L O N D O N,
Printed for *A. Baldwin*, and sold by the Booksellers of *London*
and *Westminster*, 1702. Price 12 d.

prout



Engl.
Blackwell
2-21-23
16447

The Fatal Consequences of a Treaty with FRANCE.

THERE are three things absolutely necessary to be done by those who aim at Universal Empire:

1. They must conceal their true Design, lest all their Neighbours should unite to destroy them, as common Enemies and Plagues to Mankind.
2. They must divide their Neighbours as much as possible, in their Councils at home, and in their foreign Interests in relation to one another; and in this lies the great Mystery of all their Conduct, which if he that aims at Empire, can be so happy as to effect, it infallibly brings him to his desired Haven; for by this means he supports the weaker against those that are more powerful, and consequently most able to cross his Designs: Without regard to Right or Wrong, he defends a People against their Prince, or a Prince against his People; or in Governments that incline to be Popular, he creates Divisions, and plays one Party against another. Thus, however powerful such a State may be in it self, its Divisions will render its Government weak, and its Friendship of no reputation, it being altogether unable to enter into such vigorous and effectual Measures with its Allies, as its own Interest, and the common Safety require. By these Arts he that aims at Empire becomes Arbitrator and Umpire of all

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his Neighbours Differences, whether foreign or domestick, of which he is sure to reap the solid Advantages, by enlarging his Empire, and weakening his Neighbours and Enemies ; and by keeping Animosities and Divisions on foot among them, he prevents their uniting for their common Safety, till they all by degrees become his Prey.

The third thing is, That they never make a Peace, but of necessity, nor observe it longer than till it become more profitable for them to break it than to keep it. The true and natural reason why a Prince that aims at universal Empire must never observe any Peace longer than 'tis of advantage to him, is, because the End that he proposes is founded in Violence, Rapine and Injustice ; for it is a contradiction to say that a Prince affects Empire, and yet will be satisfied to confine himself within the natural Limits of his own Dominions. Hence it follows that such an Empire must be founded upon the Spoils of his Neighbours ; and it is as evident that every Peace made between such a Prince and his Neighbours, would prove an invincible Barrier between him and the End he proposed, if he resolved to observe it. 'Tis then very plain, that in all such cases, Religion, Oaths, and the Law of Nations (which are the natural Guarantys of every Peace) are no otherways made use of, than as solemn Cheats to catch and ensnare those that depend on them. And as such a Prince can have no Faith, so he can have no regard to Justice ; for the End he proposes is an universal Robbery, which is the most unjust thing in the World : Nor can he have any Tenderness or Compassion for the Miseries of Mankind ; for as the End he proposes is the most unjust, so the Means to obtain this End are the most barbarous, inhuman and cruel that are possible to be acted, *viz.* Treasons, Rebellions, Wars, Blood, general Desolations and Oppressions, with all those Trains of Ruin and Misery that attend them. These being both in
Fact

Fact and Reason the plain, necessary and undeniable Consequences of aiming at Empire, it is easy to be observed, 1. That whoever makes that his aim, cannot *bonâ fide* be of any Religion, because both the End proposed, and the necessary Means of obtaining this End, are most unjust, violent, cruel, and directly repugnant to the Principles of all Religion, whether natural or revealed; and of consequence such a Prince is not to be bound by Arguments or Obligations deduced from any Religion. 2. That all those must grossly deceive themselves, that treat with such a Prince, out of a prospect that he will religiously and *bonâ fide* observe the Treaty; for that would stand in his way between him and his great Design of Empire: Therefore it is evident that such a Prince never enters into a Treaty, but with a real Design to deceive others, and to reap the solid Advantages of every such Treaty himself; such as are, generally to break or prevent Confederacies against him, to disarm and divide his Enemies, to secure new Conquests or Accessions of Dominion, or lastly, to put the Revenues, &c. of his own State in a better condition.

These are Truths that seem to me undeniable and evident; and the necessary Consequence that I shall deduce from them, is this, That whenever Providence shall so far second the Prudence of the Measures of those States and Powers that are Neighbours to such a Prince, as that an Alliance can be formed of Strength sufficient to be able to reduce such an Aspirer to Terms of Moderation and Equality, they are indispensably obliged to make use of that Force to reduce him to those Terms of Moderation and Equality, and never to treat with him upon any other foot: for otherwise the Princes and Governours of those States and Powers, with all those who gave them contrary Advice, become answerable before God and Man for that Misery and Ruin that shall afterwards fall upon such States, either

either thro the Ignorance or Treason of their Governours or Councils.

I think it were a needless trouble given both to my self and my Reader, to go about to prove that the *French King* has all along aimed at the Empire of this part of the World: This is a Truth so clear, that there is none that needs to be convinced. His Invasion of *Flanders* and *French County* in 67 and 68; his Invasion of *Holland*, *Flanders*, *French County*, and *Germany*, from the Year 72, to the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, sufficiently speak this Design.

But if this be not enough, let us consider with what Indignity he treated the Empire and *Spain* after the Peace of *Nimeguen* had disarmed them, and rendred them incapable to oppose him, by those great Advantages it gave him over them; for in contempt of the said Treaty he refused to deliver up those Places in *Germany* which by that Treaty he ought to have done. By virtue of the Chambers of Reunions which he set up, he laid claim to, and seized several Considerable Countries in *Germany* and *Flanders*, and among the rest the noble Garisons of *Luxemburgh* and *Strasburgh*. This indeed alarm'd *Europe*, and produc'd the League of *Ausburgh*, which was a League defensive against *France*, enter'd into by several Princes and States in the Year 83; but when *France* had got all she thought convenient to attempt at that time, she took care to secure her Usurpations to her self by a Truce of 20 Years, entred into between her, *Holland*, *Germany* and *Spain*, in the Year 84, at a time when the Empire had no Power to do it self right, because of the *Turkish War*. In the Year 1680, what Arts and Threats did not *France* make use of to engage the *Dutch* to enter into a strict Alliance with her, by virtue of which *France* offered to give them the sole *French Trade*, exclusive to all other Nations, and constantly to maintain an Army of fifty Thousand men for their Defence, and the

the States need keep only ten thousand Foot and six thousand Horse and Dragoons in their own Pay. What Intrigues did not *France* set on foot in the Empire, and what advantageous Offers did she not make it if they would elect the Dauphin King of the *Romans*? And did she not gain the Consent of all or most of the Ecclesiastical Electors? And were not the *Turks* call'd into *Hungary*, that the Empire might be forced to throw itself into the Protection of *France* upon any Terms, when she saw her Offer slighted? Tho *France* miscarried in the three last Points, yet by her foregoing Measures, and by placing the Duke of *Anjou* upon the *Spanish* Throne, she has rais'd her self to that high pitch of Grandeur of which she now stands possess'd, and which must inevitably destroy the remaining Liberties of *Europe*, and the Reformed Religion, if *England* at this time does not engage in such vigorous and necessary Measures with the Emperor, *Holland*, and their other Allies, as (by the Blessing of God) will prove effectual to reduce the exorbitant Power of *France*, put a stop to her ambitious Designs, and bring Safety to us and the rest of *Europe*; and this is only to be effected by making the War against *France* as universal as possible, so the end she may not be at liberty to turn her whole Force against the Emperor in *Italy*, nor be able to support so prodigious an Expence as she must be engag'd in by such a War. But since the Success of the Emperor's Arms has broke the Measures of his most Christian Majesty by making *Italy* the Seat of the War: Since this Success has discover'd the weak Side of *France*, and a sure way to reduce her to a moderate degree of Power; and since this has given Encouragement to form an Alliance against her of sufficient Power to wrest the *Spanish* Monarchy out of her Hands, *France* has no way left to secure to her self any considerable Part of the Spoils of *Spain*, to break a powerful Confederacy that is on

all hands forming against her, nor to repair her exhausted State, but by using her utmost Efforts to set some new Negotiation on foot this Winter, and to make some new Treaty of Partition, which must in its consequences prove fatal to ours and the common Liberties of *Europe*.

The Conduct of the Imperial Court has been too steady and just in all its Steps since the Treaty of *Reswick*, to make us apprehend that *France* will be able to gain her Point there. When both We and the *Dutch* were engag'd in Measures with *France* to justify the Treaty of Partition, which tended so much to the Dishonour, and was so repugnant to the Interest of the Imperial Family; the Imperial Court could neither be allur'd nor terrifi'd to give into them: For this cause principally, and from several considerable Accidents that have since hapned in *Spain* and *Italy*, we have reason to believe that the House of *Austria* has preserv'd its Interest pretty intire in that Monarchy, which sees it self upon the Point of becoming a Province to *France*. God Almighty has justifi'd the Wisdom of a Conduct so prudent. *France* by a very different Procedure has lost her new Friends, and the House of *Austria* has regain'd her ancient Allies. In short, we are now assur'd that the Great Alliance is concluded between the Emperor, *England*, *Holland*, and several other considerable Princes. More than this, the Emperor has justifi'd his Right to the *Spanish* Succession; he has made a great Effort in sending a considerable Army of Veterane Soldiers under the Command of brave and experienc'd Officers into *Italy*, where hitherto his Success has been equal to the Justice of his Cause. Whoever will consider the Prudence and Steadiness of those Measures, all which were entered into when the Emperor was not sure of any Support either from Us or the *Dutch*, will find no reason to believe that the Emperor will enter into any Negotiation with *France*, or divide a Succession which of Right belongs to his own Family.

As

As for *Holland*, 'tis true their Affairs were in a very melancholy Condition, when his most Christian Majesty resolv'd to quit the Treaty of Partition, and adhere to the Will of the deceas'd King of *Spain*. Their Troops were few, and a considerable Part of them, with their whole Barrier in *Flanders*, were surpris'd out of their Hands. The Measures they had taken in relation to the Treaty of Partition had separated them from their antient Allies. They presently found that notwithstanding the late complaisant Measures they engag'd in with his most Christian Majesty, their Interests could never be made one; unless *D'Avaux* could have bullied them with that haughty Memorial, wherein he fairly insinuated what they were to expect, except their future Conduct might *make them merit the Honor of his Master's Protection*; which Memorial was back'd with a formidable Army on their Frontiers. And to shew the Truth of their then Condition, let us add this further Consideration, that the most part of their Frontier Towns were unfortifi'd and defenceless, and liable to be insulted by the numerous Troops of their Enemies. 'Tis from the *Dutch* Conduct in so desperate and nice a Conjunction, that we are to admire the Prudence, Steadiness and Courage of that Powerful State, thro all which the great Wisdom and Magnanimity of our King most conspicuously shines. They set a Negotiation on foot, and under the Pretext of it they laid out their Money in fortifying their Frontiers, in raising a Powerful Army, and in establishing their antient Alliances. In conjunction with the King (who if Report has not been a Lier, has mortgag'd his own Patrimony to bear up our Part in so necessary an Expence) they give great support to the Emperor's Army in *Italy*, upon the Success of whose Arms the Sum of Affairs depends.

To crown all this, when that High Esteem and Credit which those personal Qualifications and singular Disinterestedness have so worthily procur'd him in all the Courts of *Europe*, was so well supported by the Confidence of his People express'd in the Resolutions of the Lords and Commons in the last Sessions; this gave Life and Credit to those Measures and Alliances that were forming on the other side of the Water.

When all these Measures were taken, and the *Dutch* saw themselves in a Condition not to receive Laws from their Neighbours; then it was that the King and They thought it time to break off all Negotiations with *France*, which they saw cou'd end in nothing but breaking and disarming the Confederates, and in establishing *France* in her late unjust Acquisitions, which without that new Accession of Dominion was already too powerful.

Whoever will examine the *Dutch* Conduct, which I think I have fairly stated, will find in it nothing of Weakness; 'tis in all its Steps, Prudent, Steady, and Bold: From whence we may fairly make this Inference, That they both knew their Interest, and were unanimous in prosecuting it; and that we are not to apprehend, that in their present Circumstances they will enter into a Treaty with *France*, when that Monarch was not able to persuade or frighten them into Terms in their late unfortunate Circumstances.

But if any one shall ask me why I am so much in pain about a Negotiation with *France*, since *D'Avaux* is recalled, and the Treaty at an end without any appearing prospect of its being renew'd. Besides, I have given reasons why I am of opinion that neither the Emperor nor the *Dutch* will be willing to enter into any Treaty with *France*. And nothing can be more visible than that it is directly repugnant to the Interest and high Character of the King to enter into such a Negotiation,

tiation, whose constant Honour and Glory it has been to shield *Europe* from that exorbitant Power. Notwithstanding the Truth of all this, which I acknowledg, yet I will offer those Reasons that compel me to believe that *France* will leave nothing unattempted to set a Treaty on foot this Winter; and in the next place that it is by *England* only that she can have the least hopes to succeed in this Attempt, which is the reason I think my self oblig'd to give this Caution against any such Treaty.

I am induc'd to be of this opinion, because of the ill state of the Revenue of *France*, which is mortgaged in a mighty Debt, for which a great Interest is paid. This Debt some years ago consisted of between 33 and 34 Millions Sterling only to the Town-house of *Paris* *, for which Interest was paid at 5 *per Cent.* near 1700000 *l.* The same Author tells you, that in the Year 1700 his Expence exceeded his Income 1 Million Sterling, and this when his Army consisted only of 120000 men, and before the Death of the King of *Spain*.

That Debt is without doubt greatly increased since by the Intrigues that were managed in the Court of *Spain* to obtain the Will, besides those that were openly carried on in all the Courts of *Europe* by force of Money, Faction, Promise or Threats to engage them to comply with his Pretensions, which, if they take effect, must inevitably prove fatal to them all. Add to this his great Armaments by Sea and Land, his Alliances with *Portugal*, *Savoy*, *Bavaria*, *Cologne*, and the neutral Princes, but above all, the expensive War in *Italy*. These are great and visible Expences, of which a very considerable part are necessarily to be made out of his own Kingdom. Besides the oppressive Methods that were used to raise Sums equal to so great an Expence, 'tis certainly

* *Essay of the Interest of England*, pag. 39, 40.

known that *France* has borrowed several Millions from the *Genouefe*, and much more upon the Credit of the Town-house of *Paris*. So that these great Debts and Expences coming upon the back of those that the last War left that Crown engag'd in, that Monarch finds his Country more exhausted, and his Revenues in a worse condition at the Eve of general War now ready to break out upon him, than ever they were in the most difficult part of his Reign, at the end of his most expensive Wars.

But if *France*, upon any Terms, however destructive and ruinous to the People, were able to support their Monarch in his present Usurpations and unjust Projects, I freely own that no Argument that could be drawn from the Misery which the execution of those Projects would bring upon his Country, would move me to believe that he would give up his Vanity and Ambition to prevent their Ruin; the whole Tenor of his most Christian Majesty's Reign being an unanswerable Demonstration that the Fenderness and Regard he has for the Ease and Happiness of his People is very small. However, thanks be to God we have a greater Pledg for our Safety than *the known Justice and Moderation of that Prince*.

France is visibly unable much longer to continue her present Efforts: Her foreign Expences and the *Italian War* have exhausted her of her Treasure to a degree not to be imagined, were not the Effects evident beyond contradiction.

'Twas in Spring last that the Treasurers General of the War broke for about 800000 *l.* Sterling; and whether this was done by Collusion with their King, that he might seize so much ready Money, or whether it was that he was not able to pay his Treasurers punctually, that they might be inabled to answer their Credit; take it either way, it was a certain Fore-runner of that Misery and Poverty which
has

Has since appeared in that Nation. The Credit of *France* was so low abroad, that the Bankers of *Turin* refused to accept the Bills that were drawn upon them by the Bankers of *Lyons* by order of the *French* King. And notwithstanding the Duke of *Savoy* had those Bills, with positive Assurances from the *French* Ministers that the Money was ready, yet his Royal Highness would not suffer his Troops to stir, till he had actually received the Money. All Credit, publick and private, in *France*, is destroyed; and it is undeniably true that the *French* King is forc'd to pay 15 *per Cent.* Interest for all the Money he borrows now; whereas at *Christmas* last he had it for 5 or 6.

His most Christian Majesty, to prevent the Ruin that he he saw coming so fast upon his Country, and consequently upon himself, consulted with the most intelligent of his Merchants what were the Causes of this great want of Money, and what Measures were to be taken to prevent its ill Effects? They declared the Causes of it to be the vast Sums of Money that were carried out of *France* in *Specie*, and the Apprehensions People were in of a new War. And as for a Remedy, there was none other but a Peace. But a Peace, even at that time, could not be had; but by giving the *Dutch* a Barrier, nor without giving the Emperor an Equivalent for what he was to have had by the Treaty of Partition. But *France* was then in possession of the whole immediately by his own Arms in *Flanders* and *Milan*, and by his Vice-King, his Grandson, in the rest of that Monarchy; and without doubt he thought himself secure in the possession of the whole, if he could baffle the Emperor's Arms in *Italy*, especially when we consider that the League with *Portugal*, while it continues, secures *Spain* against any Attack that way.

But God Almighty has hitherto visibly justified the Cause of the House of *Austria*, and in that (for they are inseparable))

able) the Cause of the common Liberty of *Europe*: He has blessed the Emperor's Arms with a continued Chain of Success, from the Hour they entred into *Italy* to this day.

Catinat, either for his Mismanagement or Misfortunes, has been disgrac'd, and *Villeroi's* Success at *Chiari* shews that he's not likely to repair what he found amiss. Thus the Emperor has begun the War in *Italy* with Reputation, and, which is the great Point, will be able to secure Winter-Quarters there this Winter. And *France*, under her present Misery, must unavoidably redouble her Efforts and Expences in *Italy* to carry on the War next Campaign, that if it be possible she may beat the *Germans* out of it: Already she is ordering her *Gens d'Arms* thither, and without doubt more Troops will be sent the same way.

Every one knows how expensive an *Italian* War is to *France*, both in Men and Treasure: Her Alliances there are purchased at a dear Price; and we know experimentally, that they are no longer to be kept than they are punctually paid. All the Money sent there is for ever lost to *France*, yet this is an Expence necessary to be made. Their Sales of Offices, and their boasted Capitation, with all their other Funds, are found insufficient. If Money is to be borrowed, their King must pay 15 *per Cent.* and yet all will not do. The last and only Refuge in this case is, the re-coining the Money, and raising its Standard; this will probably put him in possession of Money for the next Year's Expence, and make up the Deficiencies of his other Taxes: But this, which may be one Year's Relief for the Exchequer, will finish the Ruin of that Nation, by destroying Credit, Trade, and bringing an universal Disorder upon Business; but above all, by making his most Christian Majesty Master of the Money of *France*, who must necessarily send a great Proportion of it abroad. And as it is the sending so much of their Money abroad, that since a little before
the

the Death of the King of *Spain* (less than 18 Months time) has brought the present Misery and Poverty upon *France*, can any doubt, but that if he be obliged to continue and increase those foreign Expences for two Campaigns more, his Kingdom must be reduced to such a degree of Power, as may be consistent with the general Safety of *Europe*?

This, according to the best of my knowledg, is a plain and impartial Account of the present Condition and Misery of *France*, as it relates to their Ability or Disability to carry on their present great Designs by the Power of their Arms; in which there are some things very remarkable:

1. That since *Christmas* last the Interest of Money is rais'd upon his most Christian Majesty from six to fifteen *per Cent*.
2. That all Credit, both publick and private, is ruined in *France*; the necessary consequence of which is, that their Trade and Commerce must be under the greatest Decay and Disorder.
3. That all his other Funds and Arts of Raising Money failing, he is forc'd to have recourse to that desperate Method of recoinning his Money, and raising its Value, which before that was much too high. This Shift, tho it will supply him with present Money to answer his pressing Necessities, yet it will have very fatal Effects upon the Commerce and general Business of that Nation, and inable their King to send out a large Proportion of the little Money that is still left in *France*.
4. The Success of the Emperor's Army in *Italy* will oblige *France* greatly to encrease her Armies and Expence on that side.
5. The Success of the Emperor, and the Reputation of his Alliance with *England* and *Holland*, &c. will raise his Credit in the Empire, encourage his Friends, and facilitate his Negotiations there. On the contrary, it will put a difficulty upon the Negotiations of *France* in *Germany*, and render them both more uncertain and expensive.
6. *France* is become bankrupt in the first Campaign of a War, which is yet only,

only commenced in *Italy*; let us then consider seriously how she can possibly, for any considerable time, bear up under a much greater War there, and that spun out in length, if we, by engaging in hearty and vigorous Measures with the Emperor and *Dutch*, &c. make the War general, which is both our Safety, and in our Power.

If then by plain Deductions from Matters of Fact evidently true, it be as demonstrable as any thing in Politicks, That if the War in *Italy* be supported, and if besides we engage him in a general War by Sea and Land, which is in our power; we may, in conjunction with our Allies, force him to disgorge his late unjust Acquisitions; 'tis evident we may reduce him to what further degrees of Moderation we shall think consistent with our own and the common Safety. Nor is it to be doubted but the Success of the Imperial Arms in *Italy*, the great Alliance formed against *France*, and the crying Misery of his own State, have ere this sufficiently opened the eyes of his most Christian Majesty: A Prince of his penetration cannot but foresee that Confusion and Ruin that is so irresistably coming upon his Kingdom: He must be sensible, that unless he can prevent a general War, it is morally certain that he must not only lose those great Advantages he might have enjoy'd by the Treaty of Partition, but likewise those prodigious Sums which the violation of that Treaty and his Grandson's Usurpations have cost him.

'Tis then most certain that a Treaty is the only way to prevent a War, which will probably prove so fatal to the vast Designs of his most Christian Majesty, and so ruinous to *France*. A Treaty is the only thing that can secure him a Compensation for what he was to have had by the Treaty of Partition, and for the great Expence he has been at in supporting his Grandson. And a Treaty is the only Method left to settle the Duke of *Anjou* in

in the *Spanish* Throne. In short, nothing but a Treaty can leave *France* still in a condition to prosecute her Darling Design of obtaining the Universal Empire.

He must flatter himself extremely, that not only considers *France* at present in possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, but likewise how great a proportion of it (besides the Dutchy of *Lorain*) was to have come to that Crown in propriety by the Treaty of Partition, had it taken effect: I say that any one must flatter himself extremely, that considers this, if he can be of opinion that should *France* effect a Treaty this Winter, she will not be able to secure an Equivalent to her self for what she was to have had by the Treaty of Partition, and for quitting her Pretensions and Possession of the rest of that Monarchy.

Such a Treaty, if it could be effected, as it would be the greatest Master-piece of *French* Management that we ever had an example of, so there are not Reasons wanting that may induce them to hope to effect it in *England*.

For tho such a Treaty must be very destructive to the Reputation and Glory of the King, and to that high Character of Wisdom which he has so justly acquir'd and maintain'd; and tho in Fact it appears from the wise, steady and magnanimous Carriage of the *Dutch*, and by their breaking off their Negotiations with *D'Avaux* (all which Steps we are chiefly to attribute to the Sentiments of the King) I say, tho it appears by all the steps the *Dutch* have taken that such a Treaty is against the opinion of his Majesty: Yet since the King has graciously condescended to tell his People that he will take their Advice in his Conduct in relation to the *Spanish* Succession, which accordingly he has hitherto done, may not the *French* King hope that the Divisions and Parties are grown to such a height among us, that it may be impossible for the Nation to unite in advising and assisting his Majesty, as the present necessity of Affairs

requires? Does he not know, that things are come to that height between the two Houses of Parliament, that nothing but the greatest Prudence in the King, and the greatest Moderation and Condescension among themselves can reconcile them? May he not hope that for very different Reasons there may be found some of both Parties who may endeavour to make a Reconciliation impossible, *viz.* some of one Party, that they may not be called to an account; and some of another Party, that we may not be able to unite in Measures against a Prince, whom they look upon as the only Support of the right Line?

His most Christian Majesty knows whether he had any Creatures and Pensioners in *K. Charles* and *K. James's* Courts, and if he had, whether any of those are still in being, or any new ones made. If this should be the case, and any of them be Men of Credit and Authority, 'tis not to be doubted but they will use all their Industry to widen our Divisions, that our Allies may not be able to depend upon us; and then a Treaty would come of course.

Besides, the *French* King must be supposed to be well acquainted with the History of his own Family, and particularly of the Holy League: There he will see how far Revenge, and the Animosity of Parties, are able to carry Persons of the greatest Fortunes against the Interest of their Country: There he will find that the Men of the noblest Families in *France* carried their Revenge against *H. 3.* and *H. 4.* and their Friends so far, as to bring *France* within one Ace of falling under the Domination of *Spain*.

May not the *French* King, that in his own Family has had so great an instance of the implacable Animosities of Parties, hope that the same Spirit may carry others so far here, as to forsake the Interest of their Country, and make a new Treaty with him; especially if they believe that that is the best way to secure their own Power, and destroy their Enemies?

mies? May not his most Christian Majesty be told, that many among us will say, that we dare not trust those with the Management of a War, who all along oppos'd every Step that tended towards one? May it not be insinuated to him, that there will not be wanting those who will be jealous of an Administration in their hands who have hitherto constantly opposed the Settlement of the present Government? And that others may be jealous that the Champions of the Right Line will prove but indifferent Guardians of our Bill of Succession? May he not persuade himself that People would be willingly convinced how such men came of a sudden to forsake their *old Principles*, or *whether in truth they have forsaken them*? May not his so solemnly breaking the Treaty of *Reswick* with us, in owning the Title of the late King's Son, increase these Suspicions, and make People apprehend that that Prince's Party must be much more considerable in *England* than is generally suppos'd? since to preserve Measures with them, his most Christian Majesty has so publicly affronted our King, who is so great both by his Alliances abroad, and in the entire Love and Confidence of his People at home. May not the *French King* be told that the People of *England* will be desirous to see an Account of the Money spent in the last War, before they will engage in a new one? And may he not believe that others will oppose a War, if managed by those who have raised so great Estates out of small Employments during the late War?

It is not to be questioned but the *French King* is well informed of the Parties and Divisions that tear us in pieces, and of their several Dispositions in relation to one another. He is too well acquainted with the Advantages he has always reap'd by the Divisions of his Neighbours, not to make use of ours at this time to serve his own Purposes. *England* is at this day the great Barrier between him and his vast Designs; nor can he forget his own Interest so far, as not to use his utmost Efforts to increase our Jealousies

and Divisions this Winter to such a height, as may at least hinder us from uniting with our Allies in opposing him : And in such a case, which God prevent, will not the King be forced to act the part of a *Mediator*, instead of appearing the *Glorious Asserter of the Liberties of Europe*.

Notwithstanding these Reasons, which may seem to flatter the *French* hopes with the possibility of setting a Treaty on foot by our means this Winter ; 'tis to be expected, that the great Wisdom of the King, and that Unanimity which has appeared both in the Parliament and in the several Counties of *England*; to support him in his Designs and Government, may fix him in such a degree of Elevation, as may let both Parties see they have no way left to secure their own Reputations of being those Patriots they each pretend to be, but by concurring hearrily, in their several Stations; in giving and supporting such Advice as may turn the Duke of *Anjou* out of his usurped Dominions, and may reduce *France* to such a Ballance with her Neighbours, as may make her leave off the thoughts of Universal Empire. And as this is not to be effected but by a vigorous War, so nothing less can answer the Designs of the last Sessions of Parliament, whose Intentions were to procure Safety, and a Ballance to *Europe*. The united Wisdom of the Nation condemned the Treaty of Partition ; the House of Lords, because *they looked upon it as the Cause of the Will, and that it was contrary to the pretence of the Treaty it self, which was to prevent any Umbrage that might be taken by uniting too many States and Dominions under one Head*. The House of Commons condemned it, because *it so directly tended to increase the Power and Greatness of France, by delivering up to the French King such large Territories of the King of Spain's Dominions, and to the Destruction of the Trade of this Kingdom*.

No one can consider his most Christian Majesty and his Grandson in the intire possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, that can believe an Accommodation is to be made on better

Terms

Terms than *Spain* and the *West-Indies* for the Duke of *Anjou*; an Equivalent to *France* for what she was to have had by the Treaty of Partition, which must be either *Naples* and *Sicily*, or in lieu of them, *Milan* and *Flanders*: But there being so many great and powerful Princes and States immediately concerned in the preservation of *Flanders* and *Milan*, it is more probable she would again get *Naples* and *Sicily*.

Whoever considers of what great consequence *Milan* and *Flanders* are to the Designs of *France*, will find that they are more valuable to her than the rest of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and that they would easily and infallibly bring that Monarch to the Possession of that universal Empire he has so long aimed at.

For by the means of *Milan* the several Ports and Garrisons which the *Spaniards* possess on the Coasts of *Tuscany*, the *French* King would be secure of the Conquest of *Italy*, or of as much of it as he pleased, whenever he should think it proper for him to attempt that Conquest: 'Tis evident there is no Force or Power on that side that could or durst oppose him.

Besides, *Milan* would open a way to *France* to attack the Emperor's Hereditary Countries by *Trent* and *Tirol*, and would expose all *Germany* behind the *Danube* to be insulted by her Arms: For there lies nothing between *Milan*, and that part of *Germany*, but part of the *Venetian* Territories; and we see plainly by this War, that they are not in a condition to stop a Royal Army.

The Consequences of *Flanders* to *France* are very well known, viz. it would infallibly force the *Dutch* to throw themselves into the Protection of *France*, because the Charge of defending themselves in time of Peace against her numerous Armies would be insupportable to so small a State; nor could it agree with the Genius of so rich and trading a Country to be the Seat of War, whenever *France* would think fit to invade them.

By

The Fatal Consequences

By their throwing themselves into the Protection of *France*, their Fleets and Harbours would be at her disposal: And how fatal and ruinous such a Conjunction of Maritime Power must be to our Trade and Shipping, nay to our very Safety and Being, is so obvious, that I shall not think it worth while to insist upon it. Besides, *Flanders* in the hands of *France* would fix her Yoke about the Necks of the Electors of *Treves*, *Cologne*, the Duke of *Newburgh*, the Bishop of *Münster*; nor could his *Prussian* Majesty defend *Cleves* and *Mark* three weeks. *Oldenburgh*, *Osnaburgh*, *Minden*, *Lippe*, *Paderborn*, *Hesse*, *Westphaly*, in short, all that noble Country that lies between the *Rhine* and the *Weser*, must receive the Laws of *France*.

Thus I think it is very plain, that *Flanders* and *Milan* (nay, *Flanders* alone) would put it absolutely in the power of *France* to obtain the Universal Empire. The reason I insist so much upon this, is, to shew that if *France* can be brought by a Treaty to give up *Flanders* and *Milan* to the Emperor in lieu of his Pretensions, it is a greater Point gain'd than we can reasonably expect by way of Treaty (if his most Christian Majesty can so far blind us, as to enter into a Treaty with him) especially if we consider the great Strength of *Flanders*, and how difficult it will be to wrest it out of his hands by main Force.

Tho the Treaty of Partition gave us but a very melancholy Prospect of our *Italian* and *Turkey* Trades, which would have been liable to great disturbance in time of such a Peace as we must then have expected from *France*; and in time of War must intirely have been laid aside, because of the great Advantages *France* would have had over us by his Harbours in *Naples* and *Sicily*, and those of *Ftnal*, *Portolongone*, and *Piombino*, &c. on the Coast of *Tuscany* and the adjacent Coasts: Yet it is clear, beyond the necessity of being explained, that if *Naples* and *Sicily* be put into the
Hands

Hands of *France*, and *Spain* suffer'd to continue in the Hands of his Grandson, who, strictly speaking, can be no other than a Vicegerent to *France*. I say whoever considers this, will find it very evident that whenever *France* shall think fit to put it in execution, we must infallibly lose all our Trade to *Spain* and the *Straits*, which includes our Trades to *Italy*, *Turkey*, the *Venetian* Territories, and *Barbary* within the *Straits*. Besides that *France* by Monopolizing the *Spanish* Wool, will ingross the Trade for fine Cloth, and beat us out of that profitable Manufacture.

And here I would have it observ'd that I have taken no notice of the great Addition of Power that the Possession of those large and fruitful Countries would bring to *France*, nor of the means they would give her to conquer the rest of *Italy*; *Naples* and *Sicily* in extent being about $\frac{2}{3}$ of *Italy*, and they are Masters of a very considerable Maritime Power.

I will not here insist that there is no difference between *Spain's* being in the Hands of *France*, and in the Hands of his Grandson, because I shall have occasion to speak of that more particularly in explaining another Treaty. But if that be the Case, as I shall plainly prove, then I'm sure such a Treaty would be a thousand times worse than the Partition Treaty, therefore never can be approv'd by those who condemn'd that, or who love the Safety of their Country.

But there is a Treaty of another nature not less fatal in its Consequences, but much more dangerous in this respect, that it covers the Hook under a most specious and deceitful Bait, and therefore is more likely to impose upon us and others.

Suppose *France* should either this Winter, to prevent a general War, or afterwards to get out of it, offer to part with *Milan* and a Barrier in *Flanders*: That the entire Residue

Residue of the *Spanish* Succession should go to his Grandson, with this Proviso, that upon no pretence whatever the Crown of *Spain* could be united to the Crown of *France*, and that failing such Heirs of the Dauphin as were not Kings of *France*, there should be Limitations over to such of the Emperor's Heirs, as were not Emperors or in possession of the Hereditary Countries of that Family. That *France* in this Treaty should stipulate no particular Advantages for her self, and should withdraw all her Troops out of the *Spanish* Dominions, and oblige her self to send no more thither. And that the Trade between *France* and *Spain* on one side, and *England* and *Holland* on the other, should be fairly and equally regulated. And that all Princes and States should be invited to be Guarantees of this Treaty. Supposing all this, I will endeavour to shew the Weakness and Deceitfulness of such a Treaty, and that it will be no Security to Us or the rest of *Europe*, but on the contrary very fatal to us all.

For we are to make no difference between what such a Treaty shall leave in the Possession of *France*, or in the Possession of the Duke of *Anjou*, but must look upon all that shall be left in the Possession of the Duke of *Anjou*, to be *bonâ fide* in the Possession of *France*; and to prove this Assertion I will offer some very plain Reasons.

First, the Duke of *Burgundy* has no Child, nor has he hitherto given the World hopes that he will have any, for we have never yet heard of any Miscarriage, nor of any Symptoms of his Dutche's Breeding. If the Duke of *Burgundy* have no Children, every one knows that the Duke of *Anjou* must succeed to the Crown of *France*. There are two things very observable in this. The first is that till the Duke of *Burgundy* have Children, it is visibly the Duke of *Anjou's* Interest to be a *French* Man and not a true *Spaniard*. For if he should not govern *Spain* by the Maxims

ims and Directions of *France*, he would have all the reason imaginable to expect to be excluded from the *French* Succession, which is vastly preferable to the *Spanish* Crown ; and it would prove far more easy for a Will in this Case to exclude him from the *French* Crown, than it was for one to bring him to that of *Spain*.

The next thing observable is, that in view of that Succession it is visibly his Interest to give *France* all the Advantages over *Spain* and all other Nations that possibly he can ; and by degrees, and as fit Opportunities serve, to put the Keys of the *Spanish* Monarchy into the power of *France*: For if the Duke of *Anjou* should act otherwise, and endeavour to raise the Power and Reputation of the *Spanish* Monarchy by such Maxims as a good *Spaniard* would naturally take, and should refuse to give *France* those Advantages over her and other Nations: In this Case it would happen that when the Duke of *Anjou* should be call'd to the *French* Succession, *Spain* would be able to make some Effort to throw off the Domination of *France*: And then there is no doubt but all *Europe* would arm to relieve and support her in such a Design ; all its Kingdoms and States being so highly concern'd to hinder the Union of those Crowns. And none can doubt but as nothing can be more the Interest of the Duke of *Anjou*, than to unite those two Monarchies in himself or his Posterity ; so it is as little to be question'd that whenever such a Peace shall give him an opportunity, he will in concert with his Grandfather and Father enter into all such Measures as may make that Union unavoidable.

Nor does *Spain* want easy and visible Means of giving *France* all imaginable Advantages over the rest of *Europe* in point of Trade, and that by such Methods as can give us no sufficient ground of War against her, much less cou'd a powerful Confederacy be armed in such a Cause. For instance, *Spain* might give to *France*, exclusive of all other

Nations, the *Negro Trade* to her *West-Indies*; and under colour of that Trade *France* might be allow'd to carry her Manufactures immediately to the *Spanish Indies*, and this not openly and avowedly, but by private Orders and Instructions to her Governors and Officers there.

Nor is this a bare Suspicion of what may be done; for every Merchant knows that *Spain* has already made large and avowed Steps towards giving *France* the *Negro* and *West-India Trade*: A Company being to be set up of both Nations under a joint Stock, to carry on those Trades; and his most Christian Majesty has stipulated a considerable Proportion of this Trade for himself. Besides, *Spain* might give *France* the Monopoly of her Wool, and consequently of the Manufacture of fine Cloth.

And here we are to consider that these Infractions of the Treaty are of such a nature, as would not cost *France* or *Spain* either Time, Trouble, or Expence. Whereas if *England* and *Holland* had a mind to resent them, they cou'd never expect to bring those two powerful Nations to Reason by their own proper Force; and no other Nation in *Europe* would think it self concern'd in the Quarrel. We know and feel how difficult it is to engage *Europe* in a general War against *France* upon much greater Motives.

There needs no great matter of reasoning to foresee how greatly all this would increase the Trade, Shipping and Wealth of *France*: How soon it would relieve her present Misery, and put her in a Condition more flourishing than all her Neighbours: And how at the same time it would sink Ours and the *Dutch Trade*, Shipping and Manufactures, and bring us to a low degree of Poverty and Impuissance.

Thus then when *France* by a Treaty shall have broke and disarm'd the Confederacy now form'd against her; and when by these Concessions from *Spain* she shall have established her Manufactures and Trade, and overcome the

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Difficulties of her present Poverty, then it will be time for her to begin to fasten her Chains about the *Spanish* Monarchy. If the Duke of *Anjou* shall be willing to put the Province of *Guipuscoa*, and the Town of *Gibraltar* into the Hands of his Grandfather, to be Security for his repaying Part of that vast Debt he owes him for setting him upon the Throne of *Spain*, and maintaining him in it; must not every one allow that this will be but a pious and just Return for his Grandfather's great Kindness and Generosity?

And whoever will consider that if *France* were put in possession of *Guipuscoa* and *Gibraltar*, she would by means of the former be able to carry her Arms into the very Heart of *Spain*, and by the latter command in general the Trade of the *Straits*, and particularly all the Trade of *Spain* between *Portugal* and *Catalonia*, which she could interrupt or destroy at pleasure. 'Tis evident that in such Circumstances *Spain* could give the Duke of *Anjou* no opposition in uniting those Crowns. Nor could the Guarantees of this Noble Treaty. For Measures could easily be so concerted between the two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, that *France* might be put into possession of the Country of *Guipuscoa* and *Gibraltar* before any of the Guarantees could in the least suspect such a thing were intended, much more before any Measures could be concerted to prevent it. And of this I think I need no other Proof than the late secret and surprizing Possession of all the strong Garisons of *Flanders*, which the *French* seiz'd in one Day; and this under the Noses of *Holland* and *England*, and at a time when those Towns were garisoned with *Dutch* Troops. Besides the Time and Trouble that it would cost to set a Confederacy on foot to retrieve such a Misfortune, and to force *Spain*, contrary to the Designs of her Governors, to pursue her true Interest, I can't see that it would by any means be possible to effect it.

As for the Body of the Empire, they would no more look upon themselves to be concern'd in the seizing *Gibraltar* and *Guipuscoa*, than in the Transactions between the *Tartars* and the *Muscovites*. This appears by the great Coldness the Empire shows in engaging in the Emperor's Quarrel on this present Occasion, tho their Safety is evidently concern'd in the Issue of the *Spanish* Succession; tho it be highly their Interest to remove the *French* out of *Flanders*, and greatly for their Honor to recover *Milan*; which is a Fief of the Empire. And if any of the Princes of the Empire are coming into this present Alliance, it is plainly upon other Motives. The House of *Hanover* is strictly engag'd to follow the Fortunes of *England*. The King of *Prussia* is engag'd upon the account of his new Dignity. The House of *Newburg* is personally concern'd in those great Indignities that have been put upon his Daughter the Queen Dowager of *Spain*. Besides, the House of *Orleans* has great Pretensions upon the *Palatinate*, and the Prince of *Newburg* may hope to get them well compounded by the Success of a prosperous War. Add to all this the near Affinity and Alliance that is between this Prince and the Emperor.

Tho *Italy* be highly concern'd to keep the *French* out of her Country, yet there is not any *Italian* Prince or State that has made any Movement towards it. And *Savoy* and *Mantua* have declar'd for *France*.

Besides, the Rights of the House of *Austria* could hardly be said to be immediately concern'd in this Action, no more than they formerly look'd upon themselves to be when the King of *Spain* mortgaged *Mastricht* and *Namure* to the *Dutch*, nor so much. For in the Case of the Mortgages of *Mastricht* and *Namure*, there was but one sickly Life between the Emperor and the *Spanish* Succession: But by this Treaty there would be the Dauphin's three Sons, with
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the Issue they may have. So that from all this I conclude, that the putting *Guipuscoa* and *Gibraltar* into the hands of *France*, would be look'd upon to be only a private Transaction between the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*. *England* and *Holland*, who would be most concerned, would find too late that they were the Bubbles of a deceitful Treaty, but had no Power to right themselves. Thus the Guarantee of this Treaty would, like that of most others, prove an empty Name without effect. And it would at length turn to the eternal Reproach and Dishonour of those that were deceived into it, as it would to their Ruin.

But as the seizing *Guipuscoa* and *Gibraltar* would secure the Union of the two Kingdoms of *France* and *Spain*, so something must be done, in pursuance of the same Design, to secure *Naples* and *Sicily*: And this would easily be effected, by putting *Sicily* by way of Mortgage for that great Expence *France* has been at in placing, and defending, the Duke of *Anjou* on the Throne of *Spain*, into the hands of *France*. In this case we should have less remedy, if possible, than in the former. For *Sicily* being an Island, has no Communication with any other Country: The *French* Fleets have no Rivals in the *Straits*: *France* and *Spain* could, without aggravating the matter, support this Infraction of the Treaty with a Fleet of 80 men of War in the Line of Battel; and I believe there are no Ministers that would be hardy enough to advise *England* and *Holland* to send a Fleet of 100 men of War to recover that Island, especially if we consider that *Sicily* is above 800 Leagues distant from *England*; that all the Coast between *England* and *Sicily* is an Enemies Country, and that *Sicily* it self must be so.

Does not the proposing such a piece of Knight-Errantry look ridiculous? Would not the Execution of it be subject to a thousand unforeseen Misfortunes, and be next to impossible to be effected without some great Disaster? A

Storm

Storm would either shipwrack or disperse us upon an Enemies Coast, and either must ruin our Fleet. . . But if we came to *Sicily*, what could be done without a Land Army? And from whence must that come?

As the Possession of *Guipuscoa* and *Gibraltar* would secure the Kingdom of *Spain* to *France*, so the possession of *Sicily* would secure *Naples*: For *Naples* being surrounded by the Sea on all sides, but where it borders upon the Dominions of the Pope, and *France* being absolutely Mistress of those Seas, and of *Sicily*, which is separated from *Naples* only by a narrow Strait of two or three Miles over; it is plain, that the Fortune of *Naples* would be irretrievable, and that it must submit to the Yoke of *France*, as well as *Spain*, of which it is but a Province.

Another reason why we are to look upon the Duke of *Anjou's* Possession to be the Possession of *France*, is because tho the *French* King has suffered his Grandson to take possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, by virtue of the Will of the late King of *Spain*; yet he has never allow'd the Validity of the Renunciation made by his late Queen, the Lady *Maria Teresa*, at the *Pyrenean* Treaty. But at this day, tho he has sent the Duke of *Anjou* into *Spain*, yet he maintains, as high as ever, the Rights of the *Dauphin* and the Duke of *Burgundy*, and the nullity of the Renunciation. Neither the *Dauphin*, nor the Duke of *Burgundy* have made any publick and authentick Act since the Acceptation of the Will, whereby they have declared that that Will has destroyed their prior Right, and cut off their Pretensions to the *Spanish* Succession; nor have they by any publick Act resigned the Right that was in them in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*. All that ever I could learn was done upon this occasion was, that the *Dauphin* said publickly, he would be satisfied with the Glory of saying, *The King my Father, and the King my Son*. What therefore has been done in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*

Anjou in this point, is only a *Suspension*, or not insisting upon their Rights at this time. But the French King has actually put in their Claims in that very Memorial, wherein he tells the States of *Holland* by his Ambassador the Count de Briord, That his Master had thought fit to reject the Partition, and adhere to the Will. Tho the Reasons he gave, were not seemly in the mouth of a most Christian King, and the Eldest Son of the Church; yet they perfectly square with the known Justice and Moderation of Lewis XIV. and with that severe Reverence he has, during the whole Course of his Reign, paid to his most solemn Treaties. But to leave this Digression.

It is plain that his most Christian Majesty has taken great care, ever since his acceptance of the Will, to preserve the Dauphin's and Duke of Burgundy's Rights to the Spanish Crown, entire, and without diminution: And that the Duke of *Anjou* has no Right against his Father and eldest Brother, but only that of Possession. And no French-man can deny this, that considers the new way of Reasoning taken up in France since the Pyrenean Treaty: For, say they, tho the Contract of Marriage between Lewis XIV. and the Lady Maria Teresa, of which the Renunciation was a part (which Renunciation was the principal and most worthy part of the Pyrenean Treaty) I say, tho this Renunciation was sworn to by the present French King and Philip IV. in the presence of the Grandees of both Kingdoms. They gave it the Force of a Law and a Pragmatick Sanction in both Kingdoms. By virtue of their Prerogatives, as Sovereigns, they supply'd all Defects. His Catholick Majesty repeated all Laws or Customs in his respective Kingdoms and Territories that might repugn it. He obliged himself to enregister the Renunciation in the Council of State. And his most Christian Majesty artickled for himself and his future Queen, that after Marriage they will make another Act of Renunciation, to be registred in the Parliament of Paris; but that if his most Christian

Christian Majesty should fail in this, yet that by the very Publication of the Peace in the Kingdom of *France* it shall be held as duly made and authorized, and as passed and registred in the Parliament of *Paris*. The Infanta *Maria Theresa* being of full Age, without any Fear or Compulsion, but voluntarily, and perfectly instructed in what she was doing, signed the Act of Renunciation before Marriage. It was declar'd in the Act of Renunciation, that without the Renunciation there could be no Marriage, nor without the Marriage any Peace, nor an end put to those Miseries which had torn those two Crowns in pieces for twenty five years, in which War most of the Princes of *Europe* were engaged on one side or other. These were weighty Reasons; upon which the Marriage and Renunciation were founded, as likewise to prevent the Union of the two Crowns, which must have been fatal to *Europe*, and to establish an Equality in their Marriages: Which Equality consists chiefly in this, That *Spain* might enjoy the same Advantages by this Renunciation of excluding the Female Issue from their Succession, that *France* pretends by her Salique Law.

Now it is impossible for any *French*-man to say, that a Renunciation so solemnly made, and upon the highest and most favoured Motives that can be a Foundation to any Act, could have no Power to take away the Right of the Dauphin, and at the same time affirm that the Will of the late King of *Spain* could take away the Right of the Dauphin in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*. According to the *French* way of arguing, it could not have effected it, tho there had been nothing to be objected against the Will in point of Form: Tho his late Catholick Majesty had been perfectly in health, and in his Senses, when he made it: Tho he had been under no Terrors, when he signed it, of having his Country laid waste by the *French* Arms, or of being denied Absolution by Cardinal *Porto Carero*, or of having the Mob break
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into his Palace to demand a Son of *France* for their King. Neither the Dauphin, nor Duke of *Burgundy* have made any authentick Act of Concession of their Rights to the Duke of *Anjou*, nor have they by any publick Act owned that their Rights are destroyed by the Will. Till this be done, it is plain that the Duke of *Anjou* has only a bare Possession of the *Spanish* Throne, but that the Right continues entire in his Father and elder Brother.

If then the Duke of *Anjou* be settled upon a Throne, to which he has visibly no other Right but a bare Possession, and the Support of his Grandfather; must he not comply with all the Demands of *France* to preserve his Possession, and to merit that Protection? For if he should act otherwise, would it not be natural for his Grandfather to set up the Title of the Dauphin or Duke of *Burgundy* against him, and turn him out of *Spain*? And we see plainly, that by Terror, Bribes, and Faction, he governs *Spain* as absolutely as *France*: So that we have no reason to question his Power to effect it.

But because I have taken notice that in the very Memorial wherein his most Christian Majesty acquaints the *Dutch*, that he has thought fit to reject the Treaty of Partition, and accept the Will, he has asserted the Nullity of the Renunciation made by the Lady *Maria Theresa* his Queen, and the Dauphin's Mother, at her Marriage, and has preserved the Dauphin's Right to the *Spanish* Succession intire; and consequently that the Duke of *Anjou* has no Right against his Father and Elder Brother, but a permissive Right and a bare Possession: I will take notice of some of those Passages in that Memorial, wherein these my Assertions plainly appear. *Parag. 12.* he says, *That the Will had been of nouse, if the Nullity of the Renunciation had been acknowledged as fully during the late Catholick King's Life, as it is declared by his Will.*

Here then the Nullity of the Renunciation is expressly taken notice of; and what is more, the Renunciation is declar'd to be null by the King of *Spain's* Will, which calls the Duke of *Anjou* to the Succession. If the Renunciation be null, then it is no more to be doubted but that the Dauphin, and his Posterity have the only Right to the Crown of *Spain*. But then it is the Dauphin and Duke of *Burgundy* that have the Right, and not the Duke of *Anjou*. Let none object that the Will has taken away their Right, and given it to the Duke of *Anjou*. I have fully answered that Objection already. And now I will show you from this very Memorial, that his most Christian Majesty is of opinion, that the Will has not destroy'd the Right of the Dauphin. He sets forth, *Par. 10. If any Prince have a Right to oppose the Dispositions of that Will, there needs no more but to read them to be convinc'd that this Right belongs only to the Dauphin; but since he is willing to desist from his Pretensions in favour of his Son, &c.* For the Will fully declares the Nullity of the Renunciation, and the Right of the Dauphin; but tho the Right be in the Dauphin, yet he is willing to desist from his Pretensions in favour of his Son. This is so clear that it needs no farther Explanation. *Par. 11.* He says, *That there was a design to deprive him (the Lawful Heir) of his Right, and that the Emperor looking upon himself to be sure of the late King's Intentions, flatter'd himself with the Hopes of enjoying the whole Succession.* What then had been the Consequence, if the late King had made a Will in favour of the Arch-Duke? Why! he tells you plainly that in that case *JUSTICE, HONOUR, the Interest of the Crown, and Paternal Affection equally obliged the King to maintain with his Power the Rights of the Dauphin.*

Can any thing be more evident than that his most Christian Majesty neither is, nor ever was of opinion that the late King of *Spain* had Power to take away the Dauphin's
Right

Right by a Will? For if the late King had such a power, it is plain that *Justice* and *Honor* would have obliged his most Christian Majesty to have acquiesced in it, and not to *have maintained with his Power the Rights of the Dauphin*, which he tells the World very solemnly he would have done. For if the Renunciation was null (as this Memorial, and the late King's Will both tell you it was) then the Right to the *Spanish* Succession was inherent in the Dauphin, and after him in the Duke of *Burgundy* and his Issue, if he leave any.

Now since the French King tells you positively that the late King of *Spain* could not take away the Dauphin's Right in favor of the Arch-Duke, it is as plain he could not take it away in favor of his second Son the Duke of *Anjou*. For in point of Right and Justice there is no difference; nor is there any Part of the Memorial wherein he insists upon his Grandson's Right as given by the Will. On the contrary he every where sets up the Right of Succession. Pa. 6. He says, *The late King (of Spain) has at last done Justice to the true Heirs.* Pa. 7. He calls them *the Lawful Heirs.* Pa. 11. *The Monarchy is intirely settled upon the Lawful Heirs.* But it is hard to conceive who is intended by those Words, *True and Lawful Heirs*; it not being consistent with any Construction of Law or Reason to call the Duke of *Anjou* so, while his Father and eldest Brother are living: But the true Use of the Will was, that the *Spaniards* themselves might own the Nullity of the Renunciation, and by the Deference they paid to the Will of their King receive without Opposition a Prince of *France*.

To recapitulate the Reasons that oblige us to look on the Possession of the Duke of *Anjou* as *bonâ fide* the Possession of *France*, they are grounded as well on the Necessity the Duke of *Anjou* lies under to comply with every thing his Grandfather shall demand, as from his own real Interest to

comply with him, besides the strictest Ties of Duty and Obligation.

The Necessity appears in this : If he complys not with his Grandfather, he may by virtue of a Will made in *France* be cut off from the French Succession, which is vastly preferable to the Crown of *Spain*, and to which He, or his Children must succeed, if the Duke of *Burgundy* have no Children, of which hitherto there is little appearance.

Nor is this the only Necessity he lies under. For it appears plainly that the Rights of the Dauphin and Duke of *Burgundy* to the Crown of *Spain* are preserv'd Intire and without Diminution, so that the Duke of *Anjou* has none other than a permissive or possessory Right, supported with the Power of *France*. Wherefore if the Duke of *Anjou* should refuse to comply with his Grandfather, it is still in his power to set up the Right of the Dauphin or Duke of *Burgundy* against him, and turn him out of his new Dominions. Nor will this appear very difficult to be done, if we consider that *Spain* has no Communication with any Part of the Continent but with *France*: That *Spain* is naked and defenceless, and *France* powerfully arm'd : And that *France* can execute this before any Confederacy and Measures could be formed to prevent it. And we have found to our cost that *France* has a very powerful Party in *Spain*.

Nor can the Duke of *Anjou* refuse to comply with his Grandfather in point of Gratitude and Obligation. Has he not in favour of his Grandson shown that neither 63 Years of Age, nor his false Pretensions to Religion can cure him of his insatiable Ambition, or teach him to observe his Oaths to God, or his Faith with Man ? Has he not in favour of his Grandson boldly bid defiance to the God of Justice, who has said, *To me Vengeance belongs* ? Has he not done something more in his favour, and what from his constant want

of

of Faith, Violation of Treaties, and Contempt of Oaths, we must conclude is more terrible to him? to wit, he has armed against him the most powerful Nations and States of *Europe*, whom we are to believe *That very God of Justice, whom he has always set at nought, has stirred up against him, as the Ministers of his Vengeance.* He has already exhausted his Kingdom, and impoverish'd his Subjects to a degree not easily to be imagined, to maintain his Grandson in his *Spanish* Usurpation: And can he refuse, in Gratitude for so great Piety and Goodness express'd towards him, and to secure to his Grandfather so vast an Expence, to deliver to him the Keys of the *Spanish* Monarchy? For when all is done, *Spain* with *Naples*, and the *West Indies*, without *Guipuscoa*, *Gibraltar*, and *Sicily*, is a greater Appenage than a second Son of *France* had reason to expect, tho he had no hopes to succeed to the French Throne.

Lastly, it is visibly the Duke of *Anjou's* Interest to put the Keys of the *Spanish* Monarchy into the Hands of *France*, and to give *France* all the Advantages over *Spain*, and the other Powers of *Europe*, in Trade or otherwise that he can. For the Duke of *Burgundy* having no Children, by these Methods he will put it out of the power of *Spain*, and of the other Princes of *Europe*, to hinder the Union of the two Crowns, when he, or his Children shall be called to the French Succession.

Thus then we see that this Treaty (which is a better Accommodation than we can reasonably promise our selves without a War, if we consider the present Posture of Affairs) will positively put it into the power of *France*, to take such Measures with the Duke of *Anjou*, as will secure the Union of the two Crowns, and that it will neither be in the power, nor inclination of the Duke of *Anjou* to prevent it. We will next consider whether all the Steps *France* has made, at, and since the *Pyrenean* Treaty to this day,

day, do not manifestly shew that the Union of those Crowns is the aim at which all her Measures have steddily tended, and consequently that that Union is her great aim at this time.

My Purpose being now to shew, that his most Christian Majesty has constantly designed to unite the two Crowns of *France* and *Spain* in his own Family, since the first time his Actions will give us leave to judg of his Intentions; and that to this day he has steddily pursued the same end, and consequently that neither we nor the rest of *Europe* can be safe in any Peace that does not put it absolutely out of his power to effect it. I will begin with his Conduct at the *Pyrenean* Treaty made in 1659. In order to clear this Point, we are chiefly to consider two things that were then stipulated by *France* with *Spain*.

The first was, The Marriage of the present *French* King with the Infanta *Maria Theresa*, with her Renunciation of all the Right, that might accrue to her, of succeeding to that Crown, or any part of it, both for her self and her Posterity *in infinitum*.

The 2d is the Article in the *Pyrenean* Treaty, whereby his most Christian Majesty obliges himself to leave *Portugal* out of this Treaty, and to give her no Assistance. The Words run thus: *His said Majesty shall meddle no more with the said Affair, and doth promise and oblige himself upon his Honour, and in the Faith and Word of a King, for himself and his Successors, not to give unto the forementioned Kingdom of Portugal, neither in general, or to any Persons of it in particular, of what Dignity, Estate or Condition whatever, neither now nor hereafter, any Aid or Assistance, publick or private, directly or indirectly, of Men, Arms, Ammunition, Victuals, Ships or Money, under any pretext; nor of any thing else, either by Land or Sea, or in any other manner. And that he would not suffer Levies to be made in any part of his Kingdoms*

doms and Estates, nor grant free Passage to those which may come out of other Countries to the Assistance of the said Realm of Portugal.

Asto the first Article of the Renunciation, we will prove that it never was the Design of his most Christian Majesty to observe it, *even at the time when he was very solemnly swearing the contrary at the Altar.* Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letter to Monsieur Lionne, dated Aug. 1. 1659. says at the end of the 3d Par. *That we could not suffer our selves to be perswaded to lose so many Advantages, which with Justice we might pretend to, without agreeing to the Marriage of the King* **WITH A PRINCESS WHO MIGHT COME TO BE HEIRESS TO SO GREAT A MONARCH AS THAT OF SPAIN.** At the end of the 5th Par. he says, that when Mons. Pimentel made the Overture of the Marriage, *it was without making mention of the Renunciation.* In his Letter to Mons. Le Tellier, Aug. 23. wherein he gives an account of his fourth Conference, in the 3d Par. he sets forth those Reasons, with which he would have perswaded *Don Lewis d' Haro* to have consented to the Marriage without the Renunciation : But *Don Lewis* stop'd his mouth, by telling him the advantageous Offers the Emperor made his Master, if he would agree to marry the *Infanta* to him ; which were, that in favour of that Match he would break with France, and would in all things follow the Conduct of Spain. But that was a Match that would have broke the ambitious Designs of France, and in all other respects have turned to her disadvantage ; and therefore the Cardinal was forc'd to accept of the Match with the Renunciation.

But we shall visibly discover his Sentiments as to his Majesty's Design of adhering to the Renunciation, in that very Letter. In Par. 4. he brings in *Don Lewis* saying, *That he might assure himself that Don Lewis durst not make such a Proposition.*

in Spain (meaning of the Marriage without the Renunciation) That altho in the Council none ever thought of that Alliance without the Renunciation, yet even in that case there were none of the Council for marrying the *Infanta* with the King but himself and one more. Because, said he, *They all maintain'd, and he was of the same opinion, that notwithstanding these Renunciations, if his Master should lose his two Infants, as was much to be apprehended, the eldest not being above 20 months old, THEY MIGHT HOPE, BUT NOT EXPECT THAT FRANCE WOULD QUIT HER HOPES TO SUCCEED HIM, AND RENOUNCE SO GREAT PRETENSIONS.* Presently follows the Cardinal's own Reflections upon what *Don Lewis* said. *I am, says he, FULLT PERSWADED OF THE TRUTH OF ALL THIS FOR SEVERAL VERY STRONG AND CONCLUSIVE REASONS: And moreover I remember very well what the Queen* (his most Christian Majesty's Mother, who likewise made a Renunciation, when she was married to *Lewis XIII.*) *often told me, when her Brother* (the King of Spain) *had but one Son. But, says he in a Rapture, I was well pleased to hear the same thing from the Mouth of the first Minister of Spain, and that the whole Council of Spain had the same Sentiments.* I think the Cardinal delivers his Mind very freely to the King (for this Letter was written purposely for his perusal) and more freely than he durst have done, if he had known that his Master was resolv'd never to adhere to the Renunciation.

Monf. Aubery, who was Advocate to the Parliament, and of the King's Councils, in his *Life of Cardinal Mazarine*, which he dedicates to the French King, has this Reflection: Tom. 2. pag. 554. *The Cardinal acted prudently to sign the Contract of Marriage, without having any regard to the pretend-*
ed

ed Renunciation, which being manifestly contrary to common Right, and to the Law and general Customs of the State, **MIGHT BE FREELY CONTRADICTED AND DISAVOWED.** Thus then I think I have not only fully proved that his most Christian Majesty did not intend to observe this part of the Treaty, even when he was swearing it; but likewise that he is in no pain that the World should believe it; otherwise *M. Aubery* durst not make this Reflection in a Book which he dedicates to the King. And indeed the effect of this appeared very soon: For tho' in the 6th Article of the Contract of Marriage, it is stipulated, *And at the inserting of the same Obligation and Ratification, which her Highness shall give and make of the present Agreement, she shall make such another conjointly with the most Christian King as soon as she shall be married, which shall be enregistred in the Parliament of Paris, &c.* Yet neither the first Zeal of a young Prince for Justice and Honour, nor that Reverence which uncorrupted Youth generally bear to a solemn Oath, could prevail with his most Christian Majesty so far to forget his own Character, and *Mazarine's* Instructions, as to comply with this Article.

While the *Pyrenean* Treaty was transacting, his Catholick Majesty had two Sons; but before the Peace was signed, one of them died: So that when the Treaty was concluded, there was but one Infant, under two years of Age, between his most Christian Majesty, and his hopes of succeeding to the *Spanish* Monarchy: And considering that besides the ordinary Accidents that those of his tender Years are expos'd to, *Philip IV.* had a particular reason to be afraid of his Life, because, as *Don Lewis* told the Cardinal, his Catholick Majesty had lost all his Children the same way. *Letter to M. Le Tellier, Octob. 30. 1659.*

In expectation of the Death of this Prince, the *French* King, immediately after the Peace, took all possible Measures

tures to secure that Succession to his Children, notwithstanding the Renunciation.

The visible Methods taken to effect this, have been, 1st, To reduce that Monarchy to such a degree of Impuissance, that it might not be able to make any Effort towards its own Relief. The next was, to secure to himself those Parts of the Monarchy, even in the Life of his late Catholick Majesty, as were likely to give him the greatest Opposition, either from the Strength of the Places, or the Interest that the neighbouring Princes had in their Protection.

As to the first method, we shall see how soon his most Christian Majesty began with that, even with the most open violation of the same Treaty that we have an Example of in any Reign but his own. It appears by the 6^{oth} Article of the Treaty, that unless his most Christian Majesty abandoned *Portugal*, he was under an absolute necessity to break the Peace, and perpetuate the War. I have already given you the Article by which he obliges himself and Successors to give no manner of Aid to *Portugal*; which is so full, that nothing can be added to it, and from which there is no Evasion. It appears in twenty parts of *Mazarine's* Letters, that *Spain* would never have given up those numerous and strong Garisons which she did by the Treaty, nor have abandoned the Duke of *Lorain*, and the Prince of *Conde*, in all the material Points, had it not been upon the single Consideration that *France* gave up *Portugal*. Let us then examin how *France* behav'd her self in this Point.

It is notorious that presently after the Treaty, *France* privately sent Troops to *Portugal* in several Bodies, and encourag'd their Obstinacy. The Marquess *de la Fuente*, the *Spanish* Ambassador at *Paris*, complain'd of this Procedure to his M.C. Majesty, who immediately sent Orders to all his Ports not to suffer any Forces to embark for that Kingdom; yet 600 embark'd at one time at *Diep*, and none were hindred

in

in any other part of the Kingdom. Afterwards Mareſchal *Turenne* openly levied Men for their Aſſiſtance, and Count *Schomberg* was ſent to command them. And when the Count *De la Fuente* again repreſented, that this was a direct Contravention of the Peace, he had no other answer, but that this was a particular Act of Mareſchal *Turenne's*, in which the Court had no hand. The *Spaniards* intercepted ſeveral Letters between Monsieur *Lionne*, the Arch-biſhop of *Ambrun*, and Count *Schomberg*, which fully proved that *Schomberg* kept a conſtant Correſpondence with the Court of *France*, and received from thence his Directions for carrying on the War. But to crown theſe unjuſt Proceedings, when his moſt Chriſtian Maſteſty began to lay his Deſign for the Invaſion of the *Spaniſh Netherlands* in 67. he openly and avowedly, in defiance of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, made a League Offeſſive and Deſeſſive with *Portugal*, againſt all Nations, *England* excepted. But of this hereafter.

*At Jramento quædam eſt ſine nomine Proles
Trunca manus, & trunca pedes ; tamen impete magno
Advenit, atq; omnem vaſtat ſtirpemq; domumq;*

However, ſuch Reflections ſeem to give but little Pain to his moſt Chriſtian Maſteſty, he is much above them. He certainly gain'd the Point he aimed at by ſupporting the *Portugueſe*, which was, the breaking the Power of *Spain* ſo intirely in that War, that ſhe has not been able to make any Effort ſince ; and the very Monarchy muſt have fallen in pieces e're this, had it not been powerfully ſupported by its Neighbours.

Having thns broke the Power of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, that it might not be in a condition to give his M. C. M. any oppoſition, the next Step towards ſecuring the Succeſſion, and the Union of the two Crowns, was, even in the Life of his late Catholick Maſteſty, to poſſeſs himſelf of thoſe Provinces which were likely to give him the greateſt Oppoſition, either in reſpect of the Strength of the Places, or from the Intereſt that the neighbouring Princes were likely to take in their Preſervation, and the Power they had to oppoſe him. Theſe Places were viſibly *Flanders*, *French County* and *Milan*. We know not only the Strength of *Flanders*, but the great Intereſt that the Empire, *England* and *Holland* have in its Preſervation, which they all regard as a Barrier between them and *France*. The

Princes of the upper *Rhine*, but chiefly the *Swiss* Cantons, were to have the same regard for the *Franch* County : And all *Italy* were concerned to keep the *French* out of *Milan* ; besides, it is a Fief of the Empire. These then were the Keys of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and we shall see the great care his most C. M. took to be Master of them. We will begin with *Flanders* and *Franch* County.

On the 13th of *August*, 1665. the Queen Mother of *France* had a Discourse with the Marquess *De la Fuente*, the *Spanish* Ambassador, wherein she told him, that ' she was sensible of the ill Advice ' that was given her Son (the present *French* King) to set up Pretensions against the Monarchy of *Spain* ; she was sensible of the Desire ' of Glory which boiled in his Breast, and of the unquiet Temper ' of the *French* Nation : She was fearful these things might give Disturbance to a Peace of which she look'd upon her self to be the Author ; she desired him to advertise the King her Brother thereof, ' that he might make such Reflections as were necessary : That she ' could wish, since he had given so much for the Peace, that he ' would yet yield in something to preserve it, and stop the mouths of ' those that carried on the King her Son to violent Resolutions : That ' for her part, she would inculcate all the Moderation she wished in ' him. Indeed the *French* King's Letter to the Queen Regent of *Spain* says, that in that Conference the Queen Mother told the Marquess, she was fully satisfied ' that the Grounds of her Son's Pretensions were just, solid, and undeniable. But let this be as it will, it is not very material.

The Marquess gave the Court of *Spain* an account of this Discourse, but it coming just at the time that *Phil. IV.* fell sick of the Disease of which he died the 17th *Sept.* following, and there being nothing authentick in this Relation, the Discourse being only a thing of private Familiarity and Confidence, since it did not pass in the Form of an Ambassador, nor as a Minister from his most Christian Majesty, nor in his Name ; during the then Disorder of the Court, there was no immediate Answer returned : But after the King's Death the Marquess had Orders, that if the Queen Mother should again debate upon that Business, he should inform her fully of the Rights of her Son, and let her know that the Queen being neither Mistress nor Arbitress of those Affairs, she could not of her self dispose of them during the Regency.

To this Answer no new Instance was made, no Proposition, no
Com-

Complaint; and when the Marquess *de Bellefonds* was sent to *Madrid* upon his Complement of Condolance, he did not make the least Overture touching his Master's Pretensions. The Archbishop of *Ambrun*, the French Ambassador at *Madrid*, gave all Assurances of his Master's Intentions to keep the Peace; proposed entring into Leagues with *Spain*, and Offices of Mediation to compound the Difference with *Portugal*; and reproached those as seditious and turbulent, that would call in question his Master's Sincerity. When the Marquess *de la Fuente* took leave of his most C. M. to return into *Spain*, he charg'd him to engage his Faith and Word to the Queen, that he would keep a constant Amity with her and her Kingdoms; and this without any Restriction or Condition, there was no complaint made, nor any mention of his Master's Right upon the Dutchy of *Bra-*
bant, &c.

However, by these Methods the French King gain'd his Point, which was to lull the Spaniards asleep in the Security of so many solemn Promises of Amity and Friendship, that they might neither do the little they could towards their own Defence, nor make Alliances with their Neighbours. So fearful were the French of any such Step, that we find by Sir *William Temple's* Letter to the Earl of *Clarendon*, dated from *Brussels*, May 4. 1667. that France positively declared to the Spaniards, that if they either sign'd a Treaty with *England*, or made either a Truce or Peace with *Portugal* upon the Mediation of *England*, they would immediately declare War against them.

In the mean time France omitted no Arts to continue the War between *England* and *Holland*, which many say was begun by her Artifices, as well knowing that nothing but their Union could check her Designs. She formed Leagues in *Germany*: She spent a great deal of Money to make a King of *Poland*, who might be in her Interests: She made great Offers to the King of *Sweden*, to induce him to turn his Arms against *Germany*; and while she seemed to mediate a Peace between *Spain* and *Portugal*, she entred into an offensive League with the latter upon these Terms: That they shall have the same Friends and Enemies, except *England*. That France shall furnish them with what Men they need to carry on an offensive War against *Spain* by Sea and Land. That she shall advance to them by way of Loan, half their Pay for their Auxiliary Troops. That she shall lend them every year 300000 Crowns. That all the Ports they shall take in *Spain*, either upon one or the other Sea, shall be put into the hands of France. That they

they shall treat neither of Peace or Truce without common Consent. That this League shall be for the space of ten Years.

Tho France, for fear of alarming Europe too much, did not then think fit to set up a Title to any more than the Dutchy of Brabant with its Appurtenances, the Lordships of Mechlin, Antwerp, Upper Guelderland, Namur, Limburgh, the united Places beyond the Maese, Hainault, Artois, Cambray, the Franch County, and part of Flanders; yet it is evident, from the great Alliances she made in Germany and the North, from her Arts to continue the War between England and Holland, and from her Alliance with Portugal, that her Design was much deeper laid.

The French King having thus abus'd the Credulity of the Spanish Court, and prevented their taking necessary Measures for their own Preservation, ordered his Army to rendezvous upon the Frontiers of Flanders, under pretence of a general Muster. The 8th May, 67. he wrote to the Queen of Spain, to let her know that he was ready to put himself at the head of his Armies, to do himself Right, and sent her at the same time his Manifesto. And it is very remarkable, that in his Letter to the Queen he does not pretend there was ever any other Demand of his Rights made, but only in the Discourse between the Queen Mother and the Marquess de la Fuente, of which I have already given an account. Her Catholick Majesty gave him an Answer the 21st of the same Month, wherein with great Modesty and Reason she set forth the Injustice of his Proceedings; but since his Majesty desired an Accommodation, she was willing to conform her self to it, desiring him to name Commissioners, and appoint a Place of Treaty.

But his most Christian Majesty intended no Accommodation, for within eight days after the Date of his Letter, he left the Court to put himself at the Head of his Army, where he made those surprising Conquests that alarm'd and amaz'd all Europe.

In the mean time England and Holland clapt up a Peace; and notwithstanding the Alliance concluded between France and Portugal, England effected a Peace between Spain and Portugal; and in 68 the Triple Alliance was concluded, which stopped the Arms of France, and produced the Peace of Aix le Chappelle. This Alliance saved the Remainder of Flanders, and oblig'd France to restore Franch County, which she had conquered during the Course of the War, but first she demolished all the strong Places in it. But by this Peace

France

France retained *Charleroy, Binch, Aeth, the Places of Doway, Fort Scarpe, Tournay, Oudenard, Lille, Armentiers, Courtray, Bergues and Furnes*; which Places, with all their Appurtenances and Dependencies, were for ever given to *France*. And the Peace with *Portugal* broke her Designs of carrying her Arms into the very Heart of *Spain*, as it is visible she intended from the Articles of her League with *Portugal*, of which I have given an account.

But the *French King* saw that the Triple Alliance would prove an invincible Barrier between him and his Designs upon *Flanders* and *Franch County*, and that the *Dutch* were likely to concern themselves most in their Preservation, upon which their own depended; therefore he resolv'd to leave nothing unattempted to break that Alliance, and to make a bold push either to conquer the *Dutch*, or force them to throw themselves into his Protection, and then it is certain he would meet but with little Difficulty in executing the rest of his vast Designs.

In order to effect this, the *Dutchess* of *O'leans* made a Visit to her Brother King *Charles* at *Dover*, *May* 1670. she not only prevail'd with that Prince to disengage himself out of the Triple Alliance, but likewise to concert Measures with *France* to carry on a joint War against *Holland*. This War was begun in 72. Nor had the *Dutch* any other notice of the Designs of *France* except the Vastness of her Preparations; but Advices from all hands perswading the *Dutch* that those Preparations were intended against them, they wrote a very respectful Letter to the *French King*, *December* 10. 71. where among other things they profess themselves ready to make all reasonable Satisfaction to him, if in any thing they had failed in their Conduct towards him. But in the Answer which they receiv'd to that Letter *Jan.* 6. 72. his most Christian Majesty thinks it below him to specify his Causes of Dissatisfaction, or to demand Reparation, and only lets them know in general that he was dissatisfy'd with their Conduct: But tells them that he intends yet to arm more powerfully by Sea and Land, and that when he had arm'd to that degree he design'd, he would make that use of them that he thought most suitable to his Dignity, and for which he was accountable to none. Here then was a cruel War declared, without either demanding Satisfaction for any Injuries his most Christian Majesty might have received, or accepting the *Dutch* Offer to give him all reasonable Satisfaction, if he would let them know wherein they had offended him. Wild Beasts

Beasts and Fish prey one upon another, but surely God Almighty intended that Justice should direct the Actions of Princes.

Every one knows that this War brought *Holland* within an ace of Ruin; however *England* clapt up a separate Peace with them. *Spain* declar'd in their Defence, and by degrees a great Part of the Empire. Providence favor'd his present Majesty's Arms so far, as to save the United Provinces, but their Allies were great Sufferers; particularly *Spain*, while in lieu of *Charleroy*, *Binch*, *Aeth*, *Oudenard*, which were restored to *Spain*, and some part of his Conquests which he surrendered, the *French King* remain'd seized of the *Franch County*, Towns of *Bezancon*, *Valenciennes*, *Bouchain*, *Conde*, *Cambray*, with the *Cambresis*, *Aire*, *St. Omer*, *Ipre*, *Warwick*, *War-ton*, *Poperinghen*, *Bailleul*, *Cassel*, *Bavay*, *Maubenge*, with their Dependences, for ever.

Thus we see *Franch County* lost, and but a weak Barrier left in *Flanders*; yet his most Christian Majesty thought it was too much, for he never resolv'd to be satisfied with less than the whole. According then to his Methods of observing Treaties, presently after the Peace he set up Claims to several of the most considerable Places and Posts in *Flanders*; the Titles he set up were those of *Re-union*, *Dependances*, and *Convenience*: but tho his Titles were weak, he back'd them with a powerful Army. He well knew his Neighbours were so much weakned and exhausted by the preceding War, that they would not easily begin a new one, and he had taken care to secure the good Will of King *Charles*. The *French Troops* seized what Posts in *Flanders* they thought fit; and among others, they formally besieged and carried *Luxemburg*, one of the most considerable Frontier Garisons in *Europe*, whether you regard its Strength, or the great Command it has by its Situation. The *Spanish Provinces* were put under Military Execution, and miserably pillaged. This Conduct, with that of the same nature which was carried on in *Germany*, alarm'd *Europe*, and produc'd the League of *Ausburg*. And then *France* thought it was time to secure the best Part of what she had ravished from *Spain* by a Truce of 20 years, concluded in 84; during the Continuance of which Truce, she had conceded to her *Luxemburg* with its Provost-ry, *Beaumont*, *Beauvois* and *Chimay*, with between 30 and 40 Villages depending on them. *France* restored *Conrtray* and *Dixmuyde*, but they were first demolished. Thus she became intirely Mistress of
Franch

Franch County, and the *French* became very powerful in *Flanders*, and the *Spaniards* so weak, that during the Course of the last War, the united Power of *England* and *Holland*, besides what *Bavaria*, *Cologne*, and *Liege* contributed, were not able to hinder *France* from taking the strongest Garisons in *Flanders* from year to year, and that in view of our Armies; nor were we ever able to retake any of them by force but *Namur* only.

While *France* was seizing these noble Branches of the *Spanish* Monarchy on this side, she form'd no less Designs against her *Italian* Provinces: Tho the Match that was carrying on between the present Duke of *Savoy* and the, then, Infanta of *Portugal* in 1680, was in many things mysterious, yet in others it was not so. Were it not for the Laws of *Lamego* (which in *Portugal* have the Force of the Salique Law) it was certain the then Infanta was the presumptive Heiress of that Crown: For her Father had no Sons, and it was generally believed he never would have any. *Madam Royal*, Mother to the present Duke of *Savoy*, was left sole Regent during her Son's Minority; but his Royal Highness being of age, (for he was then 14 years old) she saw that she could not long preserve her Power. The Queen of *Portugal* was Sister to *Madam Royal*, she was an intriguing Lady, had a great hand in the Revolution that was brought about in *Portugal*, and a very considerable share in the Government. A Match then was propos'd between his Royal Highness and the Infanta of *Portugal*, and 'tis generally believed it was moved and concerted by Cardinal *D'Estrees*, who certainly was at *Turin* that year. And here we are to observe that both the Queen of *Portugal*, and *Madam Royal* of *Savoy* were *French* Ladies, Daughters to the Duke of *Nemours*. *France* essay'd every thing to effect this Match. His most Christian Majesty joined his Interest with that of the Queen's, and prevailed upon the *Cortes* to dispense with the Laws of *Lamego* in favour of this Match. In the year 1680 the Infanta was sworn Heiress to the Crown. The Queen was fond of the Match, for she had reason to believe that by marrying her Daughter to her Nephew, she would not only be able to secure, but increase the share she had in the Government. *Madam Royal*, who foresaw her Regency could not last long in *Savoy*, was to be established in the Regency when her Son went to *Portugal*, and where he was obliged to reside, and his most Christian Majesty engag'd himself to support and defend her in it.

Madam Royal soon found that this Match cou'd never be effected, nor her Regency secur'd, without the Assistance of *French Troops*. The *Savoyard* and *Piemontese* Nobility were highly intriged when the Match was proclaimed, and his Equipage sent to *Lisbon* before him. They easily foresaw that this Voyage was contriv'd by *France*, that when the Duke and his Nobility were in *Portugal*, his most Christian Majesty might meet with no opposition in seizing a naked and defenceless Country. For you must know that his Royal Highness had declar'd he expected that all those who had any relation to the Court, should attend him to *Portugal*, tho he did not require they should continue there. They consulted among themselves, and let *Madam Royal* know how prejudicial this Match would prove to the State, to which they had never given their Consent; and that they look'd upon the sending the Duke to *Portugal*, in the manner intended, as a Design to expose their Country to *France*. But the *Dutchess's* Ambition to be Mother to a King, to secure her Regency, and her Ingagements to *France*, made her not only persist in her Resolution, but send to desire the Assistance of the *French King*, without which she saw she was like to miscarry. Accordingly he, who above all others was most concern'd that the Match should go on, ordered a considerable Body of his Troops to march to the Borders of *Savoy*. The Garison of *Pignerol* was strongly reinforc'd, and 2000 new Men were sent to *Casal*, which had been newly purchased from the Duke of *Mantua*, and Quarters were preparing in *Savoy* for 3000 *French*.

The Motion of the *French Troops* did not frighten the *Savoyard* Nobility into a Compliance, but made them more sensible of their Danger. They took an opportunity, when *Madam Royal* was at her Country House, and represented to his Royal Highness how much it import'd him to consider that he was little better than a Prisoner, whilst his Dominions were surrounded with *French Troops* on every side; that the *Dutchess* had concerted Matters with his most Christian Majesty; that his best Places were to be put into that King's Hands as soon as he should embark for *Portugal*: That she was sending him to *Lisbon*, not that he might reign there, but that she might reign in *Savoy*: That he must not think to act as Sovereign in *Portugal* while the Prince and Queen lived, and consequently it was not for his Interest to be kept in subjection there, while he might stay at home and command them as his most Dutiful Subjects. They put him in mind of the mortal Hatred the *Portuguese* bore to Strangers, and

and that they were compelled to consent to this Match, and that if they should put him by the Crown as they had done the King of Spain, he was like to be turned out of all; for the French during his Absence would be sure to make themselves Masters of Savoy, and it would be a hard matter to get them into the humour to restore it.

When the young Prince in great disorder ask'd, *How these Mischiefs were to be prevented?* They resolutely told him, *There was no remedy but to sign an Order to arrest his Mother.* They pressed their point home, and told him *he must either resolve to do it immediately, or be ruined without resource.* Which accordingly he did with Tears in his Eyes. 'Tis true, she was not arrested, because she discovered the Design before it was executed. However it had the intended effect, which was to break off the Match, for she was at length convinc'd that (besides the Difficulties she would meet with otherwise) her Government would be more precarious under the French, than if her Son continued in the Country. The Duke pretended to be sick, and the Fleet of Portugal went home as it came.

Thus the Courage and Wisdom of the Nobility of Savoy and Piedmont not only preserved their own Country from falling under the Domination of France, but in that Act they saved Milan and all Italy. For it is evident, if France had made herself Mistress of Savoy and Piedmont, Milan, Lombardy, and indeed all Italy must have received her Laws: So that whoever will consider the State of Europe at that time, viz. 1682, will find France in her greatest height of Glory and Power. The greatest Princes of Christendom trembled at her Armaments, and durst not resent either her Incroachments or Affronts. I say, whoever will consider this, must confess that if this Match had taken effect, there had been an end of the Spanish Empire in Italy.

Tho this was a terrible Disappointment to France, and which she deeply resented, yet she had formed other Designs against Italy. Casal was bought from the Duke of Mantua, and strongly fortified; Casal was truly look'd upon to be the Key of Lombardy, it is situated on the Po in the Montserrat, on the Frontiers of Piedmont and Milan. All the Princes of Italy were strangely alarm'd at this Purchase, and not without a great deal of reason. But they wanted both Courage and Power to attempt to shake off the Yoke. The Duke of Savoy, to regain the good Opinion of France, whom

he durst not too far provoke, married Madamoiselle *D'Orleans*; he refused the Matches which were propos'd to him by the House of *Austria*, either with the Princess of *Newburgh*, or the Daughter of the Duke of *Tuscany*. By means of this Match *France* secured a Communication between *Pignerol* and *Casal*. In the Year 84, when things tended to an open Rupture with *Spain*, *France* sent a Fleet to *Genoa*, and threatned to bombard their City, unless, among other things, they would quit the Protection of *Spain*, and put themselves under that of *France*. And because they resolutely refus'd to comply with those unreasonable Demands, they were actually bombarded. The Governour of *Milan* armed in their Defence, and by the Mediation of the Pope and *Spain* the Business was made up, and they sent their Doge and four Senators to beg the French King's pardon as far as *Versailles*. But the *Genovese* would not consent to throw themselves into the Protection of *France*, which was a second Blow that the *Spanish* Empire in *Italy* escaped. And this I take to be the true state of the Measures *France* has visibly taken towards making the Union of the two Crowns unavoidable, from the *Pyrenean* Treaty, to the beginning of the last War.

By all this it appears that his Most Christian Majesty, by a pre-meditated Fraud deceived the *Spaniard* into a Match, under the pretence of a Renunciation, which he never intended to observe. He obliged himself to abandon *Portugal*, not with a design to observe his Oath and Treaty, but thereby to oblige *Spain* to resign so many Garisons and Countries as she did by the *Pyrenean* Treaty, and in a manner to desert her Allies, the Duke of *Lorain*, and Prince of *Conde*. By disavowing the Renunciation, he has gain'd, what he calls, a Title to the *Spanish* Monarchy; and by assisting *Portugal* he entirely broke the Power of *Spain*, which never has been able to support it self since. This was the first Step towards his making a bad Title good, *Spain* being hereby rendred incapable to make any Effort to rescue her self from the Domination of *France*. Lastly, he took all possible Measures to wrest *Flanders* and *Franch County* out of their hands; and to make the Game certain, he made the *Spaniards* secure in his repeated and solemn Promises that he intended strictly to observe the Peace and Amity with them, by which means he found them destitute both of Force and Alliances to defend themselves. I have given you an account of the

the Design he had upon *Savoy* and *Piedmont*, and afterwards of obliging the *Genovese* to abandon the Protection of *Spain*, and put themselves under that of *France*, and of his Purchase of *Casal*, all which must have proved fatal to *Milan*, and indeed to all *Italy*.

Thus *France* had taken her Measures so well, that if the late King had died before the Abdication, it is morally certain that no Alliance, nor no Power in *Europe* could have hindered her from securing the whole Succession of *Spain* for the Dauphin. Without *England* no Fleet durst have appeared either upon the Coasts of *Spain*, or in the *Mediterranean*, to relieve the *Spaniards*; and without a Fleet superior to that of *France*, all other Measures must have proved ineffectual. The Princes of *Italy* could have formed no Alliances against *France*. As for the *Spaniards*, a late Example sufficiently teaches us how far their Fear prevails upon them.

The former Case supposes the Death of the late King of *Spain* before the Abdication: but now I will suppose his late Catholick Majesty alive, and that the last War had been carried on during the Reign of the late K. *James*; or that *France* could have engaged us in a Civil War upon the landing of the Prince of *Orange* in *England* (from both which nothing but the great Goodness of God, and the Prudence and Courage of the King saved us) I say, that whoever will consider the Progress of the late War, will in either case allow that *France* must inevitably have been Mistress of *Flanders*: That either the Duke of *Savoy* must have from the beginning declared for *France*, and in that case *Milan* would have been irretrievably lost, or if he had declared against *France*, he must have lost every foot of his own Country; for in this case he could have expected no Relief either from *England* or *Holland*.

The great Conquests that the *French* Arms made in *Savoy* and *Piedmont* during the late War, notwithstanding the powerful Assistance that Prince received both from us and the *Dutch*, sufficiently prove the Truth of my Assertion: And every one must allow that if *France* were Mistress of *Savoy* and *Piedmont*, *Milan* and the rest of *Italy* either could not, or durst not give her any Opposition. Could the late Alliance without *England* have saved *Barcelona* so long as it was saved? Or could they have obliged *France* to restore it, when taken? If *Barcelona* had continued in the hands of *France*, 'tis true beyond all contradiction, that the *Spaniards* could have protected no King at *Madrid*, but one of his most Christian Majesty's chusing.

Thus

Thus I believe I have made it very plain, that from the time of the *Pyrenean Treaty* till the late Revolution, the *French King* constantly aimed at the Union of the two Crowns, and that from time to time he had taken such Measures, that without *England* all the rest of *Europe* could not prevent it. And all the World knows, that he had concerted Matters so well here, that he had nothing to apprehend from us.

The late Revolution broke his Measures. He was obliged to restore by the Treaty of *Reswick*, all that he had taken in *Catalonia* during the War. In *Flanders* he not only restored his Conquests made during the War, but likewise those Places that he had taken since the Peace of *Nimeguen*, viz. *Luxemburgh*, the County of *Chimny*, *Conrtray*, with almost all his Reunions. He was perfectly driven out of *Italy*. *Casal* was taken from him during the War: And upon the Peace of *Savoy*, he not only restored his Conquests, but likewise *Pignerol*, which is a Place of the last Importance, by its Situation commanding a Pass into *Italy*, and which had been in the hands of *France* since the Year 1631. *Germany* reaped great Advantages by the Peace, by which they are enabled to act much more powerfully in defence of their own, and the common Liberties of *Europe*, than they could when the last War began: So that if things had stood upon the foot that the Peace of *Reswick* had settled them, they were in a condition greatly to have supported the Rights of the House of *Austria*; and the *French* hopes to have obtained the Crown of *Spain* seemed to have received a mighty Check.

Such indeed were the Appearances of things, when time brought to light vast Designs deeply concerted, whereby his Most Christian Majesty has sufficiently convinced the World, that the Union of the two Monarchies has been the steady and unalterable end, I may venture to say, of all the Actions of his Reign. It is impossible for me to guess what those Views might be that engaged the King and States of *Holland* to concert the Treaty of Partition with the *French King*: whether they were of opinion that that would prove an Apple of Discord, that would make the Catholick Princes break against one another, and carry a War into *Italy*, which the Catholick Princes would otherwise endeavour to begin in the North, to the great Danger, if not to the Ruin of the Protestant Religion; and whether they might not believe, that in such a War it

was

was probable the Princes of *Italy* would exert themselves to join with the Emperor, to hinder *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Final*, and the Ports upon the Coast of *Tuscany* from falling into the hands of *France*, which, if not prevented, must have brought inevitable Ruin upon them; or whether they were of opinion, that, without any such Views, the Treaty was the best they could obtain without engaging in a War. *England* and *Holland* were greatly exhausted by the last War. Something seemed to have been carried on with too much warmth here, and with an appearance of no great Complaisance for the King, which possibly might make both the King and the States unwilling to enter into a new War to save the whole Succession upon the Uncertainty of those Measures the People of *England* might be willing to take. I say, 'tis impossible for me to guess whether these were any of those Motives that engaged the King and States to enter into the Treaty of Partition; but we are to believe better both of the Wisdom of the King and the States, than to imagin they had not either great Views, or great Necessities that obliged them to engage in it.

But however sincere their Intentions might be, it is notorious they were deceived by the *French* Infidelity: It is certain that the King and the States understood their Interest as well as his M. C. M. If any shall ask how they came to be the Bubbles of this Treaty? I answer, It was not for want of Prudence, but for want of Power: For we being unarmed; made a Treaty with a faithless Prince that was powerfully arm'd, and consequently we were not in a condition to force him to execute it, nor to prevent his Violation of it. None questions but that his M. C. M. has constantly aimed at Universal Empire; and since he has always miscarried in his Designs, in having the Dauphin chosen King of the *Romans*, the Union of the two Monarchies of *France* and *Spain* was highly necessary to effect it. If then he had adhered to this Treaty, the Union of the two Crowns, and consequently of that Empire which he has so long courted, had been delayed. He found that he grew old, and his immoderate Vanity and Ambition would not allow him to believe he had done enough, if only in imitation of *Philip* of *Macedon*, he had laid such a Foundation whereon the Dauphin, like *Alexander*, might have built the Empire of the World. This was an Honour he envied his Son, he would himself equal the Glories both of *Philip* and *Alexander*, and raise the Empire, as well as lay the Foundation.

Nothing?

Nothing but this can be the reason why he rejected the Treaty of Partition, and was at so prodigious an expence to obtain, and then to support the Will. For if the Treaty of Partition had been executed, *France* would have obtained her Design of uniting the two Crowns as securely, tho more leisurely, as she can do by adhering to the Will, and with much less Opposition. 'Tis allowed on all hands that *France*, by being in possession of *Guipuscoa*, could at pleasure have carried her Arms into the Heart of *Spain*; and consequently whoever were King of *Spain*, *France* was able to make good the Dauphin's Title whenever she thought it convenient. The Duke of *Lorraine* could never have defended *Milan*, when *Naples* and *Sicily* were in possession of *France*, with the Port of *Final* (which is a Part of *Milan*) and all the other Ports which the *Spaniards* are seized of on the Coasts of *Tuscany*.

Thus *France* by ingaging *England* and *Holland* to make the Treaty of Partition, had taken effectual Measures to secure the Union of the two Crowns. For if his Catholick Majesty had made a Will in favour of the Archduke, then his most Christian Majesty would have adhered to the Partition: And 'tis confessed on all hands, and is in it self very plain, that by it he would have been Master of the Monarchy of *Spain*, tho not without time. But if, as he has done, he could get a Will in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, he was then at once Master of their Monarchy. The Conduct of *France* on this occasion ought to be seriously weighed by all who shall advise the King to come to any new Partition with *France*, or to any Terms with the *French* King, till we have first in conjunction with our Allies, put it absolutely out of his power to prosecute his darling Design of uniting the two Crowns. Whoever would frighten us with the Expence and Tedioufness of such a War, either are not sensible of our Danger; or, if they are, they draw a poisoned Arrow out of a *French* Quiver. His most Christian Majesty out of his great Tenderness to this Nation, has named a Successor to our King; and unless we break his Power at Sea, and turn his Grandson out of *Spain*, 'tis a thousand to one, he will one day impose him upon us. War is an Evil which is always hateful for the Mischiefs it brings with it, yet 'tis sometimes not only eligible, but necessary for the greater Miseries it averts. If this were ever the Case of a Nation, it is that of *England* at this time.

Let

Let those who advise the Treaty I have been speaking of, consider that the true reasons why the *French* King broke the Treaty of Partition were, that it was more for his interest to adhere to the Will. And *England* and *Holland* who entered into the Treaty with him were not powerful enough to be Guarantees of their own Treaty. Let these Gentlemen consider whether our Condition will not be much worse in this new Treaty.

I think I have made it undeniably plain that the steady Design of his most Christian Majesty from the year 1659 to this time has been to effect the Union of the two Crowns. All his Steps, and all his Measures tended that way. I have proved it very fully in the former part of this Discourse, that this Treaty will put it more, than ever, in his power to accomplish this Design. Then can these Gentlemen either persuade themselves or others, that in compliance to their Treaty he will lay aside a form'd Design which he has carried on *per fas & nefas* for 43 years; when that very Treaty, by which they would pretend to make him lay aside that Design, will put it a hundred times more in his power to execute it than ever it has hitherto been?

He must have a great proportion of Faith that can not only believe this, but likewise that the *French* King would lose all those mighty Acquisitions, that were to be annexed to the Crown of *France* for ever by the Treaty of Partition, either out of Love to the Person of the Duke of *Anjou*, or barely out of the Vanity to make him a King, without any further prospect. Let us rather believe the Truth, that he acts in this consonantly to his old Principles, and that he never would have slighted those great Advantages, but for the sake of those far greater that must accrue to that Crown by settling the Duke of *Anjou* in *Spain*; which can be none other but the, long aimed at, Union of the two Crowns. As for his Vanity, 'tis much better satisfied by the Union of the two Crowns, and establishing the Universal Empire in his own Family, than by having one Grandson King of *France*, and another King of *Spain*.

All the World allows his most Christian Majesty to be a wise and politick Prince, and that the Study of his Life has been, to make his Family great. But if he intended seriously to observe this Treaty, we must undoubtedly change our opinion of him, and say, that he is the weakest Prince that wears a Crown (for when we speak

some Men, Morality and Religion are out of the question) and that he has laid the Foundation of the Ruin of his Family in both Branches, which is a Step so very weak, that his Enemies will never impute it to him.

For it is evident, that to obtain this Will, and afterwards to get the Duke of *Anjou* put into possession of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, and to support him in it, he has run his Crown into a vast and new Debt, which before was heavily burdened. He has exhausted his Kingdoms of its Treasures to the last degree, which appears beyond Contradiction in his altering the value of his Coin three times in less than two Months, and the mighty Rise of Interest, which have destroyed both Trade and Credit. The Debts of *France* are hereby become so great, and she is so very much drained, that it is visible nothing can retrieve her but the *Spanish* Treasure, and the *West India* Trade; nay, without those Helps, she must unavoidably sink yet much lower. Is it then possible for any one to entertain so mean Thoughts of the Wisdom of the *French* King, as to believe that in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, he would not only suffer *France* to lose those Advantages she might have reaped by the Treaty of Partition, but likewise, in favour of the same Grandson, perfectly exhaust his hereditary Kingdoms, and throw them from their late flourishing State into a languishing and consumptive Condition? What has *France* done to deserve such Treatment? Or what has the Dauphin, and Duke of *Burgundy* been guilty of, that in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, that noble Monarchy, that must one day be theirs, should be ruined?

Let us not then be afraid to advance it as a certain Principle, that his most Christian Majesty never intended to ruin his hereditary Dominions, barely to make the Duke of *Anjou* King of *Spain*: Nor directly, in opposition to all Prudence and Policy, irretrievably to weaken that which must be the Patrimony of the eldest Branch of his Family, in favour of the younger. For this must be undeniably the Fate of *France*, if her Monarch intends that the two Crowns should be really separate, and independent of one another. Let us rather say, that he intended by the Union of the two Crowns, and a free Trade to the *West Indies*, to do Justice to the Dauphin, and to give his Hereditary Dominions a large recompence for the vast Expence of Men, and Treasure they have been at to effect it.

There.

There is nothing his M. C. M. has studied so much as the Grandure of his own Family. 'Tis the Idol to which he has sacrificed all Rights, both Human and Divine. But at present I shall only desire my Reader to allow him that common Tenderness for his Posterity, that Mankind generally bear to theirs; and to believe that he would not be wanting in the ordinary Methods of Prudence to establish their Peace and Happiness. Now it is evident that if he sincerely intends that the two Crowns should continue separate and independent of one another, he has laid a lasting Foundation of Discord, and unnatural Wars between the two Branches of his House, which must inevitably weaken both, and probably end in the Ruin of one. With relation to his own Family, the Right to the Crown of *Spain* is manifestly in the Dauphin, and Duke of *Burgundy*; but if the Duke of *Burgundy* shall die without Heirs Male (as 'tis likely he may) then the Duke of *Anjou* is to be King of *France*, and the Duke of *Berry* to succeed him in *Spain*. Take it either way, the Right to the Crown of *Spain* will be in him that is King of *France*, and the Possession in him that is King of *Spain*. His M. C. M. has not thought fit to oblige either the Dauphin, or Duke of *Burgundy*, by any publick and authentick Act, to resign their Titles to the *Spanish* Crown in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*. 'Tis probable, that while the present *French* King, or Dauphin shall reign in *France*, Paternal Affection on one side, Gratitude, Interest, and filial Duty on the other, may hinder these Seeds from breaking out into any violent Effects. But when Brothers and Cousins shall come to fill the two Thrones, his M. C. M. is too clear sighted not to foresee that he has thrown a Bone of Contention between the two Branches of his Family, that cannot fail to tear both in pieces with cruel Divisions and bloody Wars, of which the Consequences are not to be foreseen.

If his Intentions are, that the two Crowns shall continue divided, he would have taken all those Methods that Prudence could suggest, to prevent that Ruin, that such Discord must bring upon his Posterity. He would have obliged the Dauphin, and Duke of *Burgundy*, to have made the most full, and authentick Acts of Renunciation in the favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, that could have been fram'd, which he would have ratified in the Parliament at *Paris* in the most solemn manner: He would have adjusted their different Pretensions so clearly, as to have left no room for future Claims on either side.

But if nothing of this has been done, can we believe otherwise, than that he intends to prevent this Ruin, from falling upon his Family, another way; that is, by the Union of the two Monarchies?

If, contrary to the expectation of the World, the Duke of *Burgundy* shall have Heirs Male (and who knows what care may have been taken to prevent this, or what other Assurances they may have in *France* that he never will have any?) In this case the Duke of *Anjou* is to be no more than the Vice-gerent of *France* in *Spain*. And as it will not be in the power of that Prince to help himself, so he will not have any real Cause to complain: For this will be an honourable Preferment for a second Son of *France*. 'Tis not to be denied but that hitherto this is the only part the Duke of *Anjou* has acted. He is as much under the Directions of his Grandfather as either *Villeroi*, or *Boufflers*. Both the Kingdom, and the Provinces of *Spain* are intirely under the Administration of *Versailles*; and to make things yet more easy, there is a Communication of Honours and Privileges between the Grandees of *Spain*, and the Peers of *France*, which is a Step I believe never was made but where there was either an actual Union of Dominions, or one intended, and but seldom in that case. Thus then the great Difficulties of reducing the *Spanish* Monarchy to be a Province of *France*, are all overcome; *Spain* and her Provinces being already under an intire *French* Administration, and her King is visibly no more than a Vicegerent.

But: if the Duke of *Burgundy* shall die without Children, as is much more probable, then the Duke of *Anjou* is to enjoy both Monarchies. And tho I hope what has been already said puts this matter out of dispute, yet to stop the mouths of all Gainfayers, I will confirm it from the Mouth of his most Christian Majesty, in the very Instrument he published for the preservation of the Duke of *Anjou's* Rights to inherit the Crown of *France*, in case the Duke of *Burgundy* should die without Children. After a Preamble nothing to our purpose, save that it takes notice of the Dauphin's lawful Rights, it goes on: For these Reasons, and other great Considerations thereunto moving, &c. we have said, declared, and ordained, and by these Presents do say, &c. And it is our Will and Pleasure, that our most dear and beloved Son the King of *Spain* shall always preserve the Rights of his Birth in the same manner as if he had actually resided in our Kingdom. Then he goes on, and says, that if the Duke of *Burgundy* shall die without leaving Issue Male behind him; In such case

our said Grandson the King of Spain, claiming the Rights of his Birth, shall be the true and lawful Successor and Heir of our Crown and Dominions, though he were at that time absent and residing out of our Kingdom. And after his decease, his true and lawful Heirs begotten in lawful Wedlock, shall come to the same Succession. It being our pleasure, for the Reasons above-said, that neither our said Grandchild nor his Issue-male, shall be censured or reputed less qualified or capacitated to come to the said Crown, &c. So we give in Command, &c.

Here it is plain, that his most Christian Majesty has fully taken off the Mask, and discovered the truth of his Intentions: For in contradiction to what he would impose upon the World, *that he does not intend the Union of the two Crowns*; and in contradiction to the 12th Article of his late Catholick Majesty's Will, where it is thus expressed; *And as it is my intention, and that it much imports the Repose of Christendom and Europe, and the Peace of my said Kingdoms, that this Monarchy should always be separate from the Crown of France*; I declare, that if the Duke of Anjou happen to die or fall Heir to that Crown, and prefer it to this of Spain, the Succession of Spain shall go to the Duke of Berry his Brother, the Dauphin's third Son, in that same manner, &c. I say, his most Christian Majesty, in contradiction, as well to his own Pretensions, as to this Clause of the Will, in case the Duke of Burgundy shall die without Heirs Male, not only restores the Duke of Anjou to his Rights of succeeding to the Crown of France, but does it absolutely, without any manner of Restriction or Limitation; and does by no Insinuation oblige him to quit the Crown of Spain, or any part of it, to the Duke of Berry.

I believe then I have put it beyond all dispute, and that from the most weighty Considerations imaginable, that if his most Christian Majesty shall enter into such a Treaty, it is only with a design to break it, and under the pretext of this Treaty to unite the two Crowns, as I have shewn it will be in his power to do, when the present Alliance shall be broken and disarmed.

But if any shall be still of opinion, that we ought, either now, or after a War shall be begun, to accommodate Matters upon these terms, they must say one of these two things: Either, that we are not concerned in the Union of the two Crowns; or else that we are in a condition to compel France, and Spain to observe the Treaty, and to be Guarantees of its Execution. If they affirm the former, the King, both Houses of Parliament, and the whole Body of the Nation,

Nation, whom they represent (except particular Persons) are of another opinion. And therefore whoever will take upon him to maintain this Paradox, is either not to be credited, or to be suspected. But if they will say, we are able to be Guarantees of this Treaty, I answer;

First, by denying that we are in a condition to warrant this Peace, which I have proved already, where I take notice of the great ease this Treaty would give *France* to effect the Union, and the Impossibility that we, and the *Dutch* would lie under to prevent it. Referring the Reader in this point to what I have said there, I will only add here, that I would have those, who advise such a Treaty, to consider in what a noble condition we were in to warrant the Treaty of Partition, when *England* and *Portugal* and *Holland* were not only Guarantees, but principal Parties contracting. Did not *Europe* with astonishment behold his most Christian Majesty put his Grandson in possession of the intire *Spanish* Monarchy? Did they not suffer the *French* King to seize *Flanders* and *Milan*? And tho so many powerful Nations were interested to prevent this Violence, was there one Sword drawn to oppose it?

If the Emperor has carried so early and vigorous a War into *Italy*, it was to vindicate the Rights of his Family, which were so highly violated by the Duke of *Anjou's* Intrusion: His Rights are hitherto intire, and not diminished by any Treaty.

If the Emperor's Army had been beaten out of *Italy*, I see no remedy, but *Europe* must have received the Laws of *France*. In that case it would be hard to say, either where *France* could have been attack'd? or who are those Princes would have dared to attack her? or what Success they could have proposed in their Attempt? For 'tis not to be doubted but it is this Success alone, that encourages many Princes to come into the present Alliance, and awes others from engaging in opposite Interests.

But when the *French* King shall find it convenient to break the Treaty I'm now speaking of, the case will be very different. This Treaty will settle the Rights of the two Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*: It will establish the Duke of *Anjou* in his part of the *Spanish* Monarchy, whose Title must then be acknowledged by all *Europe*: It will be next to impossible to engage the Body of the Empire in a War to vindicate the Injuries his Most Christian Majesty shall be committing behind the *Pyrenees*, and in which they will have no particular

ticular Interests. Besides, the *Spaniards*, who will be immediately griev'd, can make no Complaints, nor demand any Redress, because those Contraventions of the Peace will be carried on in concert with the Duke of *Anjou*, who will then be their King. Moreover, in such a War we cannot touch *Spain*, unless we think fit to invade it by Sea, which in that case will be next to impossible; and *France* can only be attacked on the sides of *Flanders* and *Germany*, and we know full well by the two last Wars that nothing is to be decided that way.

But against my opinion, and all appearance of Reason, I will allow these Gentlemen that we are able to form a League to warrant this Treaty. Let us examin whether this will mend our condition.

There is but one way in nature to warrant this Peace; and that is, we must enter into a League of Warrantship with the Emperor, the Empire, the *Dutch*, and all other Nations who shall be willing to come into it. By this Treaty the Guarantees must stipulate to maintain constantly in time of Peace, a determin'd Proportion of Force by Sea and Land, which they shall judg sufficient to oblige his most Christian Majesty to perform his new Treaty of Peace, whenever he shall go about to infringe it. And this League of Warrantship must continue for such a certain number of Years, as shall be found reasonable. All other Methods of warranting this Peace are mere Chimeras. If nothing else will shew the Folly of such a Peace, this League of Warrantship will do it sufficiently.

1. For to avoid the Expence of a War, which, considering the exhausted Condition of *France*, the unsettled State of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and the Power of the Confederacy, cannot in reason last above two or three years, we shall ingage our selves in a lasting and consumptive Expence, of which none can foresee the end. Thus we shall, really and truly, lie under the Burden and Expence of a War, while we enjoy nothing but the Name of a Peace. I desire those Gentlemen would reflect upon this as they ought, who would have us make a Peace out of good Husbandry.

2. This League of Warrantship will oblige us to keep up a very considerable Standing Army in time of Peace; and when we shall be for some years accustomed to have an Army among us, 'tis possible Princes may always find out new Pretences to keep them on foot. Whenever we come to keep up Standing Armies in time of Peace,

Peace, we may venture to say, that our Liberty and Constitution are at an end. Surely then no one can advise us to make such a Peace, who has the Spirit of an *English* man, and that true Love and Value for his Liberty and Constitution, to which Freemen ought to sacrifice all that is dear to them upon Earth.

3. In concert with our Allies we must always be ready to enter into a War with *France* and *Spain*, whenever they attempt to break this Treaty. Let us consider how easy this will be to our Merchants, who, in time of Peace, have seldom so little as three Millions of Effects in those two Kingdoms.

Such a Peace then (upon the Supposition that we could warrant it) is to be rejected with Scorn and Indignation by every true *English* man, as being both dishonourable, and destructive to his Country. For it necessarily involves us in this sad Dilemma, either we must sit still and patiently let *France* overrun all *Europe*, and at length our selves; or else we must enter into the Warranty I have mentioned, and so become Slaves at home as the less Evil.

I must here, to avoid Repetitions, refer my Reader to the first five Pages of this Discourse; there he will find it plainly proved, that it is contrary to the Principles of all who aim at universal Empire, to observe any Treaty longer than it is for their Interest to break it. They seldom make Treaties of Peace, but with a Design to break great Confederacies against them, to secure their Conquests or Accessions of Dominion, or to put the Revenues, &c. of their own State in a better Condition, that they may afterwards fall upon their divided, and unarm'd Neighbours with greater Force. There he will likewise find it prov'd that Universal Empire is the great aim of his most Christian Majesty. All *Europe* has dearly found how religiously he has observed those Maxims, to the Violation, I may venture to say, of every single Treaty of Peace he has made. For this reason we betray our selves if ever we enter into any Treaty of Peace with him, till we first reduce him to such an Equality with his Neighbours, as may break his great Design of Empire, and may make him share the Fears as well as Hopes of entering into a new War. This never can be done till the Duke of *Anjou* be driven out of *Spain*, and consequently the *Indies*; it plainly appearing the same thing whether they continue in the Hands of the Grandson, or Grandfather.

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By the Union of *France* with *Spain*, *France* will be intirely Mistress of the *Spanish* Wool, and consequently of the Manufacture of fine Cloth, to the utter loss of that Manufacture here. She will absolutely command the Mouth of the *Straits*, and consequently she may either hinder the Ships of any other Nation from passing thro them, or admit them to it upon what Terms she thinks fit. So that *England*, and *Holland* must either, intirely give up their Trade to the *Straits*, or at best hold it precariously of *France*, and under her Limitations. Let those two Nations who are chiefly concern'd in this, consider how much of their Manufactures, how much of their Trade, how much of their Maritime Power depends upon this single Article ! How shall we imploy our Poor, when the Manufactures are lost ? How shall we carry on our Trade, when so great a Channel is stopt ? How must our Shipping decrease, which under God is our Safety and Bulwark ?

France, by being Mistress of *Spain*, will command the Trade and Treasure of the *West Indies*. She is already forming Companies both in *France*, and *Spain*, to ingross that Commerce, which a Peace will give her leisure to effect. If we suffer his most Christian Majesty to add the Wealth of *America* to the Power of *France*, then indeed *France* will be irresistible. In a little time she will not only find Employment for her own Poor, but the Manufacturers of *England*, and other Nations, must either go there for Work, or starve at home. She will increase in Manufactures, Trade, and Shipping ; she will recruit her exhausted State, she will become the Centre of the Wealth of the *Indies* ; and *England* and *Holland* must sink in the same proportion that she rises.

There is nothing at this day that gives us the least Hopes of retrieving any Part of the *Spanish* Monarchy out of the Hands of *France*, but only her Want of Money. Were it not for this, we are sensible she would command both Alliances and Troops in *Germany*, *Switzerland*, *Italy*, and *Flanders*.

What then shall we say ? Shall we by an inglorious Treaty, add the Trade and Treasure of *Spain* and the *Indies*, to the already exorbitant Power of *France* ? Shall we make her Mistress of so inexhaustible a Fund of Wealth, that she may reduce Us, and all *Europe*, to a State of Slavery ? Has not the French King affronted our King and Nation in contempt of his Treaties, and in the face of the World ? Has he not sufficiently declared his Intentions of sub-
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verting our present Establishment, and of imposing Popery upon us, by declaring the pretended Prince of *Wales* to be our King? And shall we leave it in his power to execute these unjust Designs, by giving the Duke of *Anjou*, that is to say the French King, *Spain* and the *Indies*?

In prudence *England* and *Holland* ought to declare to the World, that they begin the War upon the foot of turning the Duke of *Anjou* out of the whole *Spanish* Succession. And this for several weighty Reasons.

There is nothing under Heaven can so intirely reconcile the *Spaniards* to the Interest of the House of *Austria*, and the Designs of her Allies, as such a Declaration; or will so effectually destroy the Credit that *France* may still have preserved in *Spain*. This is not to be deny'd, if we consider, that tho' the House of *Austria* govern'd *Spain* for near two Centuries, yet they lost their Interest there, when it was once known that the *Spanish* Sceptre could not be continued longer in that Family, without dismembring her Empire. *France*, her immemorial Enemy, offer'd to preserve her Monarchy intire, provided she would receive the Duke of *Anjou* for her King. This single Motive outweigh'd all other Considerations: She forgot her inbred Antipathy to the *French* Nation, and her Friendship and Obligations to the Family of her former Kings. She accepted his most Christian Majesty's Offer, tho' she could not but foresee, that a *French* King would necessarily make her Crown dependent on that of *France*.

But the Scene of Affairs is much altered since that time. The exhausted State of *France*, the great Confederacy form'd against her, and the Success of the Emperor's Arms in *Italy*, sufficiently declare to all the World, and to *Spain* it self, that *France* cannot preserve her Monarchy intire. The Confederates can do it if they are willing. *France* has taught us how the Affections of that People are to be gained; let us turn her own Arts against her, nor can we fail to reap the greatest Advantages from such a Resolution, whenever *England* and *Holland* shall think it a proper time to land an Army in *Spain* upon this foot. Besides, *Spain* will hereby recover her former Independance.

But if we begin a War upon the foot of dividing her Monarchy, we make an inseparable Union of Interests between *Spain* and the Duke of *Anjou*; and in this Case we must expect to meet with the last Efforts of an incens'd and desperate Nation. In such
a War.

a War, we shall probably find greater Opposition in recovering either *Naples*, or *Sicily* singly, than in turning the Duke of *Anjou* out of *Spain*, as well for the Reason I have before taken notice of, as because of the great distance between the Emperor's Countrys and those Kingdoms. He cannot send an Army into *Naples* without the Permission of other Princes; and who can tell how willing they may be to give his Troops free Passage? He can have no Magazines provided, without which it is not easy to be imagined, how a War can be carried on in an Enemy's Country. Any considerable Blow at so great a Distance from his own Dominions, must prove irretrievable. Besides the greater Difficulty and Hazard there will be in carrying on a War in *Naples* and *Sicily*, than in carrying on a War in *Spain*, we are to consider that if we turn the Duke of *Anjou* out of *Spain*, *Naples*, *Sicily*, and the *Indies* follow of course, and without striking a Blow, they being no more than Members that must partake of the Fortune of their Head.

England and *Holland* are to bear a great Part of the Expence in recovering, even *Naples* and *Sicily*, out of the Hands of the Duke of *Anjou*, by their Fleets in the *Straits*, and the Diversion they must give *France* on this side, besides the Money they give the Emperor. This War, for reasons already given, will very probably prove more bloody, difficult, and chargeable, than a War to recover the whole. But if *England* and *Holland* shall find it necessary to engage in such an Expence, surely they will think it reasonable to have the greatest regard to their own Security, viz. of their Trade and Commerce, preferably to all other Considerations.

Admit then that either by a Treaty, or a War, we should recover all the *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy*, with *Flanders*, to the House of *Austria*. We shall hereby gain a Barrier to the *Dutch*. 'Tis confess'd. We shall, at a great Expence, secure the Liberty of *Italy*. But what Pretensions has that Nation to so great Charity, from *England* and *Holland*? Have they not always betrayed the Liberties of *Europe*? Has any one of her Princes drawn a Sword in the Defence of Liberty, except the Duke of *Savoy* in the last War? And did he not basely betray us before it ended? Does not *Savoy* and *Mantua* at this day join with *France*? And are not the rest of the *Italian* Princes Neutrals? Surely we ought to have a greater regard for our own, than their Security; and the great Ex-

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pence that *England* and *Holland* are at, and which *England* must yet increafe, will merit better Terms than a bare Barrier for the *Dutch* in *Flanders*. We must take care to secure our Manufactures, our Commerce, and our Maritime Power, by which alone those Nations are considerable in the World. *Flanders*, *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, cannot secure our Manufactures, our *Spanish*, *Straits*, and *West-India* Trades, of the latter of which our *African* Trade is but a consequence. The single Town of *Cadix* is of greater moment to the Trade of *England* and *Holland*, than the whole Dominions of *Spain* in *Italy*. All Expedients to secure the Trade of those two Nations, are ridiculous, except that one of turning the Duke of *Anjou* out of *Spain*. When this shall be effected, the rest of the Monarchy, except *Flanders* and *Milan*, that are garisoned by *French* Troops, must follow the Fortune of their Head.

If we turn the Duke of *Anjou* out of *Spain*, the House of *Austria* will be able to make us a good Compensation for the Charges of the War; but without that, we must expect no return for our Expences. We know they cannot repay us in Money; they can give us little or no Advantage in our Trade. And for cautionary Towns, I know none they could give us, that would be worth our acceptance, except *Offend* and *Newport*. But, instead of repaying us any part of our Expence, these Garisons would be a perpetual Charge to us; besides the Jealousy that Troops maintain'd there, might create in the People of *England*. Moreover, the Fate of *Tangier* and *Dunkirk* ought to make us sensible, that those Garisons will be more secure, if we put the House of *Austria* in a condition to protect them, by making the Arch-Duke King of *Spain*, than if we kept them in our own hands.

It is either a malicious or an ignorant Surmise, to say, that if the Arch-Duke were King of *Spain*, the House of *Austria* would become too powerful. The Dominions of both Branches of the House of *Austria* were united in the Person of *Charles V.* who was Great both for his Wisdom, Courage, and Military Conduct. The Kingdom of *Spain* was then at least four times more powerful than at this day: He was absolutely Master of the Seas: The Dutchy of *Burgundy*, with the 17 Provinces, were intire in him. Yet notwithstanding all these Advantages, he was but barely a Match for *France*. If his Son *Philip II.* put *France* very hard to it, we must not attribute that to the Power of *Spain*, but to the Civil Wars of

France.

France. But as soon as *Henry IV.* had appeased the Civil Wars and settled the distracted condition of the Kingdom, the Superiority of *France* quickly appeared; and all the World allows, that both Branches of the House of *Austria* could not have prevented some fatal Blow that he was preparing to strike, had not a sudden and violent Death stop'd his Designs. Since that time *France* has taken from them a great part of *Flanders*, the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, the Country of *Rouffillon*, and some other Places on the Frontiers of *Spain*, and has made considerable Conquests on the side of *Germany*. *Spain* is greatly dispeopled, and her maritime Power intirely lost; and, ever since the time *Gustaphus Adolphus* broke the Power of the German Branch of the House of *Austria*, we find that both Branches united have made no tolerable Ballance against *France*; the Experience of which has cost us, and all *Europe*, very dear during the continuance of the last two Wars. Surely then it would be very extravagant, if in order to make a Ballance in *Europe*, we should take away from the Weight of the House of *Austria*, which before was very much too light, and add to the weight of *France*, that was already exorbitantly great. And this must be the case, unless we turn the Duke of *Anjou* out of the whole.

This was truly foreseen by the great Wisdom of the House of Lords, who for this very reason address'd the King to enter into an Alliance with the Emperor, upon the foot of the Grand Alliance made with him in the Year 89. By which Alliance *England* and *Holland* obliged themselves to assist the Emperor to secure the intire Succession of the *Spanish* Monarchy to his own Family. Which Alliance was not only founded upon Justice, but was consonant to the Interest of *Europe* in general, and of these two Nations in particular.

Tho the House of Commons did not think fit to express their Sentiments in so plain words as the House of Lords, yet in effect they said little less, for they condemn'd the Treaty of Partition, as to our present Subject, for two reasons: One was, *because it so directly tended to increase the Power and Greatness of France, by delivering up to the French King such large Territories of the King of Spain's Dominions.* The other was, that it so directly tended to the Destruction of the Trade of this Kingdom. As to the first reason, none can doubt but *Spain* and the *West-Indies* are vastly preferable to that part of the *Spanish* Dominions that *France* was to have had by the Treaty of Partiton, whether

ther you regard Power, Wealth, or Extent of Dominions. As for the second reason, there is no question, but that it was with regard to *Naples* and *Sicily*, that they looked upon that Treaty to be ruinous to our Trade, and that with regard to our Trades to *Turkey*, and the Gulph of *Venice*, and the Isles in the *Archipelagus*. But *Spain*, in the hands of *France*, shuts up the very Mouth of the *Straits*, and does much more infallibly ruin, not only those Trades, but likewise our Trades to *Italy*, *Barbary* within the *Straits*, and to *Spain*. Besides, that *France* will be able to ingross the Trade to the *Spanish Indies*, and stop that Channel of Wealth, that has made *England* and *Holland* so great. So that from the Opinion of the House of Commons, it must be ruinous to us, as well in respect of Power, as of Trade, if *France* be permitted to retain *Naples* and *Sicily*, but much more *Spain*; and I believe no true *English*-man ever thought to let *France* enjoy *Flanders*.

Besides, the House of Commons thought it proper in their last Address to the King, to assure his Majesty, That they would be ready to assist and support him in such Alliances as he should think fit to make, &c. for reducing the exorbitant Power of *France*. But surely it never can be supposed, that so wise an Assembly could be of opinion, that the way to reduce her Exorbitant Power is, by any Treaty, to increase her Dominions.

Since then the united Wisdom of the Nation has agreed, That we cannot be safe, unless we reduce the Exorbitant Power of *France*, by turning the Duke of *Anjou* out of the *Spanish Succession*; let us heartily enter into the War, and depend upon God for Success. * *Justum est Bellum quibus necessarium; & pia arma, quibus nulla, nisi in armis, relinquitur spes.* Nor have we any reason to doubt of Success, since we are to believe, that those numerous and premeditated Acts of Injustice, and those repeated Violations of Treaties, that have raised his M. C. M. to his present Greatness, and have armed all *Europe* in their just Defence, have likewise heaped up a Treasure of Divine Vengeance, that is ready to break upon his Head. † *Adeste Dii testes Fœderis; & expetite pœnas debitas simul vobis violatis, nobisq; per vestrum numen deceptis.*

* Liv. lib. 9. † Idem lib. 6.

